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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 56 JUNE 1958 
ANTITRUST CON SID ERA TIO NS IN 
MOTOR CARRIER MERGERSt 
Carl H. Fulda* 
l. THE APPLICABLE STATUTES 
No. 8 
U NIFICATION of separate independent business enterprises in a single organization may raise important questions of antitrust 
policy. The entity which emerges may have acquired, as a result 
of such unification, a market position of such significance that a 
substantial lessening of competition or even the creation of a 
monopoly becomes not only possible but probable. This would be 
apparent whenever opportunities for buyers of the products or 
services of the new single unit to shop freely, and to make inde-
pendent decisions as to prices, channels of purchases and selection 
of suppliers were to be seriously curtailed, or where such curtail-
ment could be expected in due course.1 On the other hand, unifica-
tion may lead to lower costs and increased efficiency, and may even 
enhance competition by permitting smaller firms to consolidate 
their resources in order to increase their ability to engage in rivalry 
with larger firms. These considerations are reflected in section 7 
of the Clayton Act which declares unlawful the acquisition of the 
whole or any part of the stock or assets of a corporation engaged 
in interstate commerce, "where in any line of commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
tThis is one of several articles which will be integrated into a text on "Competition 
in the Regulated Industries" to be published by Little, Brown &: Company (Trade _ 
Regulation Series, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Editor). A previous article, "Competition 
Versus Regulation: The Agricultural Exemption in the Motor Carrier Act," appeared 
in 11 VAND. L. REv. 543 (1958). The special problem of motor-carrier mergers involving 
control by a railroad (under the proviso of section 5(2)(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act) 
will be treated in a later article. 
•Professor of Law, The Ohio State University.-Ed. 
1 FTC: REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 184 (May 1955). 
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stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."2 
This was intended "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their 
incipiency."3 Therefore, "the section is violated whether or not 
actual restraints or ip.onopolies, or the substantial lessening of 
competition, have occurred or are intended."4 
Section 11 of the Clayton Act provides that "authority to en-
force compliance with" this so-called anti-merger law by common 
carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act is vested in the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, but the attorney general is au-
thorized to intervene in such proceedings before the Commission.5 
However, section 5(2)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides: 
"It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of 
the [Interstate Commerce] Commission . . . "(i) for two or 
more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or fran-
chises, or any part thereof, into one corporation fqr the owner-
ship, management, and operation of the properties theretofore 
in separate ownership; or for any carrier, or two or more car-
riers jointly, to acquire control of another through owner-
ship of its stock or otherwise .... " 6 
If the Commission, after notice and hearing, finds that the pro-
posed transaction "will be consistent with the public interest, it 
shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, 
upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications . . . 
found to be just and reasonable."7 Thereafter, all participants in 
a transaction thus authorized "shall be ... relieved from the opera-
tion of the antitrust laws ... in so far as may be necessary to enable 
them to carry into effect the transaction to be approved or provided 
for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by 
-the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any proper-
ties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such 
transactions. "8 
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125-1128 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §18. The 
1950 amendment broadened the section by adding acquisition of the assets of another 
company. For discussion of other changes of the original wording see REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 117 (1955) 
(hereinafter cited REPORT). 
3 S. Rep. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950), quoted in REPORT 117. 
4 United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 at 589 (1957). For 
a list of cases involving mergers under the Sherman Act, see REPORT at 115. 
5 38 Stat. 734 (1934), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21. 
6 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(a). 
7 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(b). 
s 54 Stat. 908-909 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(11). The 1950 amendment of §7 of the 
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II. ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST 
AND REGULATORY POLICIES 
1239 
This complicated statutory scheme requires an accommodation 
of the philosophy of competition embodied in the antitrust laws 
with the philosophy of regulation by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. It indicates that at some point the two may become 
irreconcilable, and that in such a case the Commission may ap-
prove transactions which, without such approval, would violate the 
antitrust laws. In short, the Commission seems to be authorized to 
give its blessing to mergers with anti-competitive effects if it finds 
such mergers "consistent with the public interest." This statement 
demonstrates, of course, that the "public interest" with respect 
to mergers in a regulated industry such as motor carriers may have 
to be measured by other than antitrust standards ordinarily ap-
plicable to interstate commerce. 
All of these problems were presented to the Supreme Court in 
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,9 where the Court was 
asked to set aside an order of the Commission which had author-
ized consolidation of seven large motor carriers of property into 
Associated Transport, Inc. The Commission found great benefits 
would result from the proposed unification: "More efficient and 
greater utilization of equipment, and corresponding reduction in 
consumption of motor fuel and tires," "a higher load factor on 
vehicles," "a large reduction in the number of trucks required for 
peddler runs and for pick-up and delivery service at terminal 
points," and "extension of scientific maintenance and safety pro-
grams."10 Vehicles could be more easily shifted from one part of the 
system to another to meet seasonal demands; separate terminals 
could be consolidated at some points; at others a "rearrangement 
of use" of terminals, one for in-bound and one for out-bound traf-
fic, would reduce congestion and bring about substantial econ-
omies. Poor terminals would be replaced by satisfactory ones. 
Clayton Act, note 2 supra, explicitly states that nothing contained in that section shall 
apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. 
9 321 U.S. 67 (1944). 
10 Associated Transport, lnc.-Control and Consolidation-Arrow Carrier Corp., 38 
M.C.C. 137 at 143 (1942). A prior attempt at large scale consolidation by these parties 
was disapproved in the Transport Co. case, 36 M.C.C. 61 (1940), because of failure to 
simplify corporate structure and excessive consideration. See Meck and Bogue, "Federal 
Regulation of Motor Carrier Unification," 50 YALE L. J. 1376 (1941). 
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Through movement of freight would reduce loss and damage 
claims, expedite service and eliminate the complications arising 
from interchange of vehicles between independent connecting 
carriers. "Substantial savings" could also be made in general and 
administrative expenses and by the new firm's "ability to obtain 
necessary financing at lower cost."11 
But what about the effect on competition? Concededly, this 
merger would create "the largest common carrier of property by 
motor vehicle in the United States,"12 a vertical "end-to-end con-
solidation from points in the far South to New England," with 
routes "extending over 24,338 miles"13 as the result of the unifica-
tion of carriers operating in the South with Northern Lines. In 
fact, "there would be no other single carrier authorized to operate 
throughout the territory ... between Boston and New Orleans."14 
The merger was, also, a horizontal one in that some of the parties 
were in competition with each other in the same territory where 
they owned duplicating facilities.15 Hence, the Antitrust Division 
and others opposed the merger on the ground that it would unduly 
restrain competition in the motor carrier industry. The Commis-
sion acknowledged that "substantial competition exists between 
certain of the carriers involved" which would be eliminated by 
consummation of the proposal. But section 5 of the Interstate 
Commerce Act was not intended to permit approval of "only such 
transactions as would not result in an 'unreasonable' restraint of 
competition within the meaning of the antitrust laws .... " Instead, 
the Commission read into the specific reference to antitrust the 
congressional intent that it is authorized "to permit unifications 
which would, except for such approval, result in restraining com-
petition contrary to the antitrust laws, where the disadvantages of 
such restraint are overcome by other advantages in the public in-
terest"16 such as those found in this case. Moreover, a detailed an-
1138 M.C.C. 137 at 144-145 (1942). The gross revenues of Associated Transport have 
been increasing every year and are still the largest among carriers of general freight. 
But its net revenues have declined since 1950. See Moooy's 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, 
p. 1371. In the third quarter of 1956 :fifty other carriers had higher nets. S. Hearings 
Before Select Committee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentration), 85th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1957). See also id., pp. 103, 104, 152. 
12 38 M.C.C. 137 at 161 (1942). 
13 321 U.S. 67 at 71 (1944). 
14 38 M.C.C. 137 at 160 (1942). 
15 Id. at 144; REPORT 289. 
16 38 M:.C.C. 137 at 150 (1942). Accord, Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-Purchase-
Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 38 M.C.C. 577 at 591 (1942) (Acquisition of certain 
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alysis of the New England, Middle Atlantic and Southern regions17 
demonstrated that "there would remain ample competitive motor-
carrier service throughout the territory involved" in addition to 
rail, contract carrier and freight forwarding services.18 
The majority of the Supreme Court fully approved. The Court 
observed that section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act was "not 
only a more recent but a more specific expression of policy"19 than 
antitrust legislation.20 In fact, "the premises of motor carrier reg-
ulation posit some curtailment of free and unrestrained competi-
tion."21 The provision for administrative grant of immunity from 
the antitrust laws took into account the fact that rate regulation 
was a "safeguard against the evils attending monopoly."22 Hence, 
the Commission was "not bound . . . to accede to the policies of 
the antitrust laws so completely that only where 'inadequate' trans-
portation facilities are sought to be made 'adequate' by consolida-
tion can their dictates be overborne by 'the public interest.' " On 
operating rights in Idaho, Montana, Utah and Nevada approved against objections of 
Antitrust Division to virtual monopoly of vendee in the West. Vendor and vendee 
operated 383 miles over the same highway. Remainder of the routes (667 :miles) sought 
to be purchased were complementary to vendee's routes. Vendee would have competition 
from at least one other motor carrier at all points). 
17 38 M.C.C. 137 at 151-159 (1942). 
18 Id. at 159-160. The Commission also pointed out that "there are a number of 
large systems of motor carriers of property in existence at present •.• " and that due 
to the ease of entry and the advantages of small carriers because of "their ability to 
render a more personalized service . • • monopoly is little to be feared at this stage 
of the development of the trucking industry." Id. at 161. As to the danger of "diversion 
of interchange traffic now delivered by the carriers involved to other connecting lines" 
the Commission observed that the traffic diverted from connecting carriers to the 
combined new enterprise would be equalized by traffic which would be diverted from 
the applicant to others. Id. at 162. See the discussion of this aspect of the case in 
Schwartz, "Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication 
of Judicial Responsibility," 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 at 446-447 (1954). 
19 321 U.S. 67 at 79 (1944). 
20 As noted in note 8 supra, the 1950 amendment of the "anti-merger" section of 
the Clayton Act explicitly acknowledged the supremacy of the Commission in approving 
merger proposals. 
21321 U.S. 67 at 83 (1944). The quoted statement is documented by a footnote 
referring to the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. See 1934 REPORT OF 
THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, H. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 13: 
"It may be taken as settled that there is no substantial body of opinion in the country 
in favor of permitting competition to reign in the transportation field free and without 
restraint." See, also, statement of Commissioner Eastman in "Regulation of Interstate 
Motor Carriers," Hearing before Subcommittee of House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5262 and 6016, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1935) (hereinafter 
cited as House Hearings): " ••• there is now a tremendous oversupply of transportation 
facilities and there has been an extraordinary increase in transportation competition." 
22 321 U.S. 67 at 85 (1944). 
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the other hand, the antitrust laws are not wholly inapplicable.23 
The Court defined the Commission's task as requiring it to "esti-
mate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of com-
petition which will result from the proposed consolidation and 
consider them along with the advantages of improved service, 
safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the con-
solidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation 
policy."24 
The Court found unassailable the Commission's performance 
of this "complex task" in this instance. 
The dissent of Justice Douglas urged that "administrative au-
thority to replace the competitive system with a cartel should be 
strictly construed." ConsequeJ.?.tly, particular mergers or consolida-
tions should be permitted only upon an affirmative finding "that 
the policy of the Transportation Act would be thwarted" by with-
holding such permission.25 
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the 
McLean Trucking Co. case thus involves the standard of legality 
by-which the Commission shall judge the public interest in merger 
applications.26 The dissent would resolve all doubts in favor of anti-
trust policy and thus create a presumption requiring disapproval 
of mergers with anti-competitive effects, subject to rebuttal. The 
majority merely demands that the Commission consider anti-
competitive effects as one of several factors which it' must weigh 
before reaching a decision. Obviously,27 under this view approval 
of mergers is infinitely easier than it would have been had the dis-
sent prevailed. In this connection it has been noted that antitrust 
problems with respect to motor carrier consolidations may be in-
tensified because entry into the industry is restricted.28 Without 
such restriction, competition and the low cost of entry for new-
comers would be an adequate safeguard against monopoly. But, in 
view of the certificate requirements of the act, "the principal 
motivation for most acquisitions is the desire to obtain additional 
operating rights" previously granted to other carriers.29 The ques-
23 Id. at 86. 
24 Id. at 87. 
25 Id. at 93-94. 
26 See SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AND RELATED 
MATERIALS 102 (1952). 
27 In view of the Court's tendency not to disturb administrative decisions based on 
expert knowledge of the regulated industries. 
28 49 u.s.c. (1952) §§306-309. 
29 The Attorney General's Committee (REPORT 266) comments: "Were motor carrier 
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tion of the competitive effect of such combined rights is thus likely 
to arise in most merger cases. 
In so far as the merger approved in the McLean Trucking 
case is concerned, "substantial" curtailment of competition be-
tween the carriers involved was admitted. But, as noted above, the 
Commission took great pains to explain that "ample" competition 
remained. Consequently, the merger might have been defensible 
if the Sherman Act alone had been applicable.30 In fact, thirteen 
years after the Supreme Court rejected the request of McLean 
Trucking Company to set aside this consolidation, that company 
itself had become so prosperous as to apply for listing of its stock 
on the New York Stock Exchange.31 Its fears about the effect of 
the merger thus proved groundless. In any event, it would be an 
over-simplification to conclude from the McLean Trucking case 
that the Commission's job merely consists of balancing adverse 
effects on competition against favorable results of improved serv-
ice, lower costs, and so on, and to approve the merger if it feels 
that the latter outweigh the former. The task is more complicated 
because, as the Supreme Court noted in the McLean Trucking 
case,32 federal motor carrier regulation was not intended to elimi-
nate all competition, but only excessive or wasteful competition. 
Hence, an additional inquiry into the question as to how much 
competition has been or will be restrained, and how much will sur-
vive, and whether the latter will be a sufficient barrier against the 
detrimental effects of monopoly, seems inevitable in merger cases. 
It is hardly necessary to add that this increases immeasurably the 
difficulties and unpredictabilities of the outcome in each case33 and 
the range of discretion to be exercised by the Commission. 
entry unrestricted, rarely, if ever, would a consolidation raise important antitrust 
problems." 
30 Compare United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 530 (1948) (elimination 
of competition between participants to a merger held not unreasonable). Again, Justice 
Douglas dissented. Under the more severe tests of §7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, the 
case for the merger would have been more difficult. 
31 "Milestone Looms for Truckers," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1957, p. 38:2. The 
company operates in 17 states and has 4000 stockholders. Estimated gross income in 1957: 
$29,000,000. Approval of the application would make this the first Motor Freight Carrier 
so listed. McLean Trucking Co. was incorporated in 1940, four years before the Supreme 
Court decision. By 1951, its operating revenues amounted to $13,613,000. In 1956 this 
had grown to $21,414,000. MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, pp. 1377, 1378. 
32 Note 21 supra. 
33 See KOONTZ AND GABLE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF EcoNO!IIIC ENTERPRISE 179-180 (1956): 
"Regulation [of Transportation] as Monopolies while insisting on Competition:-Perhaps 
it is in the public interest to promote competition, while at the same time placing 
1244 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The problem of reconciling antitrust with regulatory policies 
is, perhaps, even more dramatically illustrated in the case of Allied 
Van Lines, Inc., the largest mover of household goods in the coun-
try. Allied was incorporated in 1928 for the purpose of solving the 
back-haul problem. "Because of the character of the traffic, it was 
difficult for either the warehousemen-carriers or their drivers to 
arrange return loads and the ratio of empty to loaded vehicle-
miles became burdensomely high."34 Accordingly, Allied entered 
into contracts with independent motor carriers of household goods 
who were classified as "agents" and grouped in two classes: "(I) 
booking or non-hauling agents, who solicit and record shipments 
for transportation in Allied's name but do not supply any equip-
ment or perform any physical transportation, and (2) combined 
booking and hauling agents, commonly referred to simply as haul-
ing agents, who ... also supply equipment for the transportation 
of designated shipments in Allied'S- name." In 1944, Allied had 
272 booking agents and 354 hauling agents in 47 states.35 Pur-
suant to these 1;:ontracts 
" ... hauling agents agreed to register with Allied all ship-
ments moving over I 00 miles booked by them, haul loads 
booked by Allied and other nonhauling agents, and maintain 
at least one van bearing Allied's name, color and design. Non-
hauling agents entered into similar contracts but did not agree 
to transport loads or maintain equipment. Uniformity of 
soliciting, booking, and dispatching was assured by issuance 
of all shipping papers in Allied's name and pursuant to its 
rules and regulations. . . . Allied assumed final responsibility 
to the public for all loss and damage, but this was charged 
back against the particular agent if responsibility for damage 
could be so traced. "36 
Hauling agents received 96 percent of the line-haul revenue 
for shipments booked and hauled by them, the balance going to 
Allied as a service charge. The share of booking agents ranged 
from 20 to 25 percent. Settlements were made monthly with all 
obstacles to the free play of competitive forces in an industry, such as transportation, 
where competitive excesses might impair the entire economy. But the inconsistency 
should be recognized and its manifestations in controls carefully weighed." 
34Allied Van Lines, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 46 M.C.C. 159 at 162 (1946). 
35 Id. at 166. 
36 Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Evanston Fireproof Warehouse-Control, 40 
M.C.C. 557 at 562-563 (1946). 
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agents.37 Drivers, helpers and mechanics were hired and paid by 
the "agents."38 
After enactment of the Motor Carrier Act most of Allied's 
agents received individual "grandfather" operating authorities 
from the Commission.39 But the position of Allied itself was not 
clear. In 1943 the Commission denied Allied's application for ap-
proval of its agreements with its agents pursuant to section 5(1) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act which authorizes approval of con-
tracts by common carriers "for the pooling or division of traffic, or 
of service, or of gross or net earnings, or of any portion thereof," 
upon a finding that such pooling "will be in the interest of better 
service to the public or of economy in operation, and will not 
unduly restrain competition."40 The Commission held that these 
agreements went beyond mere "pooling" in that they effected 
complete surrender to Allied by the individual motor-carrier 
"agents" of their power to control their future operations, and 
Allied as their principal would assume the status of a common car-
rier.41 Subsequently, the Antitrust Division, which had opposed 
the pooling application, filed a complaint against Allied charging 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The result was a consent 
decree which required cancellation of Allied's contracts with its 
agents and enjoined Allied and all of its agents from maintaining 
or furthering any arrangements with others, from agreeing upon 
rates and practices with any carrier or warehouseman except by 
establishing joint rates for interline shipments over connecting 
routes, from making uniform rates or practices, allocating ter-
ritory, leasing equipment to Allied and from conditioning dealings 
of Allied with carriers upon their refraining from dealing with 
others. Plaintiff was authorized to petition for dissolution of the 
Allied System, and the court retained jurisdiction for that pur-
pose.42 
37 Id. at 563. For further details see Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Pooling, 39 M.C.C. 287 
at 296-297 (1943). 
38 40 M.C.C. 557 at 560 (1946). 
39 46 M.C.C. 159 at 166 (1946). Section 206 of the Motor Carrier Act [49 Stat. 551 
(1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §306] provides that "if any such carrier or predecessor in interest 
was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle on June 1, 1935 ••• 
and has so operated since that time • • • the Commission shall issue such certificate 
without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served 
by such operation. . • ." 
40 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(1). 
u 39 M.C.C. 287 at 306 (1943). Competition between the "pooling" carriers had been 
eliminated by the plan. Id. at 304. 
42 United States v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., National Furniture Warehousemen's Assn., 
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Shortly thereafter the Commission denied Allied's application 
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a common 
carrier by motor vehicle of household goods. 43 It again held that 
Allied was not a common carrier, since it "does not o,vn any ve-
hicles and does not contemplate so doing and . . . does not have 
funds with which to provide itself with equipment, and facilities 
with which to conduct a nation-wide transportation system." 
Hence, Allied was merely "a device" in the hands of its members, 
who compete with each other. Such common control afforded 
undesirable opportunities for unfair competition, unjust discrim-
inations and preferences between shippers and consignees.44 More-
over, discontinuance of Allied would not be detrimental to the 
public, because there are "a large number of carriers authorized 
to transport household goods over large portions of the country 
and there are several nation-wide operators. . . . Many carriers, 
both large and small, have successfully conducted household-goods 
operations without the aid of a superimposed holder of a blanket 
certificate such as Allied is seeking."45 Finally, the antitrust con-
sent decree was referred to in support of th~ conclusion that Al-
lied's proposed operations are not required by present or future 
public convenience and necessity.46 
This virtual death sentence of Allied was nullified less than 
three months later by the Commission's approval of Allied's pro-
posal to purchase the operating rights of 326 of its hauling agents 
for $1. Each transferor would purchase one share of Allied stock 
at a price of $10 a share, with the result that mvnership of Allied 
would pass to its former hauling agents. A so-called noncarrier 
agency agreement would be entered into between Allied and the 
transferors, pursuant to which Allied agreed to employ each trans-
feror as its agent. Allied would insure and compensate each trans-
feror and would lease all vehicles meeting its specifications.47 The 
transferors would lose their operating rights and, thus, cease to 
be interstate motor carriers. Consequently, they could not resume 
rendering service if they should discontinue their connection with 
Allied.48 The Commission now found that the transaction was 
(Civil Action No. 44-C-30, N.D. 111., Dec. 28, 1945) 1944-1945 CCH Trade Cas. 1[57,427. 
43 46 M.C.C. 159 (1946). 
44 Id. at 200, 201 and cases there cited. 
45 Id. at 205. 
46 Id. at 206, 207. 
47 40 M.C.C. 557 at 563-565 (1946). 
48 Id. at 610. 
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covered by the language of section 5(2)(a)(i) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act permitting authorization for "a person which is not a 
carrier [such as Allied] to acquire control of two or more car-
riers,''49 would permit integration of a cooperative nation-wide 
system, remove any question of illegality under the antitrust laws 
and terminate expensive litigation. 50 
With respect to competition the Commission noted that its 
approval would "give permanence to substantially the same ar-
rangement that originated in 1928," which "always had the com-
petition of numerous carriers, large and small, Nation-wide and 
local."51 Hence, "elimination of some competition among the trans-
feror-applicants ... is not the controlling consideration."52 The 
transaction would be in the public interest since "adequate com-
petition" would remain.53 The antitrust decree would be wiped 
out by the Commission's approval, pursuant to section 5(11) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act; indeed, this was sanctioned by 
precedent. In United States v. Southern Pacific Company,54 the 
Supreme Court directed "that a decree be entered severing the 
control by the Southern Pacific of the Central Pacific by stock 
ownership or by lease." Subsequently, the Commission approved 
such a lease,55 with the result that the Supreme Court's decision 
was superseded by legalization of a previously unlawful relation-
ship between the two railroads.56 
The Commission's approval of the Allied Van Lines consolida-
tion was criticized by two dissenting members57 and by more recent 
commentators58 who were understandably bewildered by the aston-
49 Id. at 583. 
50 Id. at 596. 
51 Id. at 592. The other Nation-wide carriers of household goods are Aero Mayflower 
Transit Co., United Van Lines, Inc., North American Van Lines, Inc. and Greyvan Lines, 
Inc. Id. at 589. The problem of competition is discussed at 588-594. 
52 Id. at 592. 
53 Id. at 594. 
54 259 U.S. 214 at 241 (1922). 
55 Control of Central Pacific by Southern Pacific, 76 I.C.C. 508 at 516 (1923): "When 
by our order based upon broad considerations of the public interest we in effect grant 
relief against antitrust laws, ..• we are exercising a power which the statute gives to 
us alone. Evidence as to public benefits to be derived from common control of competing 
carriers, which would be immaterial in a prosecution under the Sherman Act, might be 
entirely pertinent in a proceeding before us. . . ." 
56 United States v. Southern Pacific Co., (D.C. Utah 1923) 290 F. 443. 
57 40 M.C.C. 557 at 610-612 (1946). 
58 Adams and Hendry, "Trucking Mergers, Concentration, and Small Business: An 
Analysis of I.C.C. Policy, 1950-1956,'' Appendix to S. Hearings Before Select Committee 
on Small Business (Trucking ,Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 338-
343 (1957). (This Appendix is hereinafter cited as Adams Report.) 
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ishing jump from total condemnation to total approval of opera-
tions different in legal forms but identical in practical effect. Yet, 
the approval decision followed closely the rationale of the Supreme 
Court in the McLean Trucking case. Creation of a large entity, 
the largest of its kind, would produce tangible benefits, and com-
petition would remain alive, although the elimination of the com-
petition among the formerly independent members of the com-
bination had been condemned as violative of the antitrust laws.59 
Consequently, the Commission's approval was in accordance with 
existing law as to mergers. It was also induced by reasons of ad-
ministrative and economic preference for supervising one instead 
of 326 certificate holders,60 and this attitude-also demonstrated 
by the Commission's treatment of Allied's principal competitors61 
-rather than the debatable technicality that prior to consolidation 
Allied was not a "common carrier" within the meaning of the 
act62 may explain the apparent inconsistency in the dispositions of 
Allied's applications for a certificate and for authority to merge. 
Indeed, the nature of household-goods transportation was thought 
to justify and even require participation in large groups of wide 
territorial coverage in order to lick the return-load problem, and 
59 Even under the antitrust laws cooperative arrangements by a multitude of small 
firms may be condemned though comparable in effect to the lawful activities of one 
single large firm. See the Brandeis dissent in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 257 U.S. 377 at 419 (1921). Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 
288 U.S. 344 at 374 (1933). 
60 In the Associated Transport case, 38 M.C.C. 137 at 162 (1942), the Commission 
said that "the legislative history of section 5 indicates a clear Congressional intent to 
encourage unifications. . . ." The Adams Report, note 58 supra, points out (p. 337) 
that due to subsequent acquisitions of operating rights the number of stockholder-agents 
of Allied reached 625 .by mid-1956. See Allied Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Allen, 45 M.C.C. 
751 (1947) (purchase of rights of 47 motor-vehicle common carriers); Allied Van Lines, 
Inc.-Purchase-Johnston, 50 M.C.C. 273 (1948) (purchase of rights of 6 carriers); Allied 
Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Albrent Freight and Storage Corp., 50 M.C.C. 653 (1948) 
(purchase of 4 carriers); Allied Van Lines-Purchase-Cold Spring Storage Co., 58 M.C.C. 
101 (1951) (purchase of 6 carriers). The Adams Report criticizes the Commission for its 
failure to understand the impact of the Allied System on the market (p. 343). But the 
Commission dealt with that problem explicitly as shown in notes 51-53 supra. 
61 They are United Van Lines and North American Van Lines, organized along 
lines similar to. Allied. Geitz Storage & Moving Co., Inc.-Investigation of Control-
United Van Lines, Inc., 65 ,M.C.C. 257 (1955), reversing 55 M.C.C. 649 (1949) (operations 
of United Van Lines approved, in spite of pooling agreements unlawfully entered into 
without prior Commission approval; -benefits of coordinated activities held to outweigh 
. restraint on competition betlveen United and its agents, and preservation of United 
deemed necessary to offer competition to other major van lines). See Adams Report, 
note 58 supra, pp. 343-348. Accord, North American Van Lines, Inc.-Investigation of 
Control, 60 M.C.C. 701 (1955). See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 348-350. 
62 For ·the Commission's interpretation of the statutory definition in 49 U.S.C. (1952) 
§303(14), see 46 M.C.C. 159 at 189-197 (1946). 
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the existence of several such groups competing with each other 
is deemed to protect the public against monopolistic abuses.63 
However, it may not always work out that way. In 1956 the lead-
ing moving and storage companies consented to the entry of a 
decree forbidding them to "fix, stabilize or tamper with price 
quotations to the U.S. Government for interstate movement of 
household goods of military personnel."64 The antitrust weapon 
was, thus, used as a supplement to regulatory supervision. But 
this intrusion of the Sherman Act was short-lived. A 1957 amend-
ment of section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act now authorizes 
the commission to approve agreements relating to quotations of 
rates or charges to the United States Government for transporta-
tion of persons or property; such approval shall relieve the parties 
from antitrust liability in the same manner as provided in the 
Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 for rate agreements generally.65 
In any event, some crucial questions remain: How much com-
petition is deemed necessary to protect the public against the evils 
of monopoly, how much is irrelevant, and how much is intoler-
able?66 And is there a regulatory philosophy which may furnish 
guideposts for solving these problems? The search for even ten-
tative answers, if there are any, requires a survey of the commis-
sion's leading merger decisions. 67 
III. THE GREYHOUND MERGERS 
Greyhound Corporation is the largest motor carrier of passen-
gers in the United States. It was organized in 1926, and operates 
63 Testimony of 0. Clarke, chairman of I.C.C., in S. Hearings Before Select Com-
mittee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 
48 (1957). There are in addition to the large systems, numerous independent interstate 
and intrastate carriers of household goods. Statement by Clardy, id. at 167. See Adams 
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 227-228, on the structure of the Household Movers Industry. 
64 United States Aero Mayflower Transit Co., (S.D. Ga. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade 
Cas. 1[68,526. The government did not consent, but did not appeal. 
65 71 Stat. 564 (1957), 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §22(2). The Reed-Bulwinkle Act is 
to be found at 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(b). 
66 See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 355-356. 
67 From enactment of the -Motor Carrier Act to Nov. I, 1955, the Commission received 
6,123 merger applications involving motor carriers. I.C.C. Administration of the Motor 
Carrier Act, S. Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., p. 329 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Small Business Hearings). From Nov. I, 1955 to 
Oct. 31, 1956 there were 379 such applications. I.C.C. 70m ANN. REP. 78. The Commission 
commented (at 75-76) on the continuing trend of the development of motor carrier 
systems through purchases and mergers. Since the 1920's many individual small scale 
operators then in the majority have died or sold out. See also I.C.C. 7Isr ANN. REP. 
53-56 (1957). 
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nearly 6,000 buses over certificated routes approximating 100,000 
miles, thus· accounting for about one half of intercity bus bus-
iness. 68 In 1956 it had total assets in excess of $251,000,000 and 
gross revenues in excess of $238,000, operated over 505,000,000 
bus miles and 9,371,000,000 passenger miles.69 
In 1936 the Commission approved unopposed merger applica-
tions of 22 of the constituent companies of the Greyhound Sys-
tem.70 It described Greyhound Corporation as "a single proprietary 
holding company" embracing "groups of subsidiary companies 
operating bus lines practically throughout continental United 
States."71 The plan for a national system had been developed along 
three lines: "(I) Autonomous regional operation; (2) uniform 
national policies and centralized control of common functions 
and standards; and (3) coordination, wherever possible, with other 
forms of transportation." From its inception, the system grew by 
acquisitions of many large and small companies.72 
Subsequently, many applications for approval of additional 
acquisitions by Greyhound were presented to the Commission. 
Some of these were denied because of the dominant position of 
the Greyhound System and the resulting danger of a bus monopoly 
in the area. Thus, in Illinois Greyhound Lines-Purchases-The 
Southern Ltd., Inc.,73 Southern operated "over routes complemen-
tary to those of members of the Greyhound system, but ... com-
petitive with the latter between Chicago and Paducah, between 
Chicago and Evansville, and between Chicago and Terre Haute 
and Vincennes .... If the purchase [ of Southern] were approved, 
Greyhound Companies would operate over all of the most direct 
routes between Chicago and Evansville and Chicago and Paducah, 
whereas no other motorbus company would be authorized to oper-
68 "Building a Highway Empire," Bus. WEEK, March 16, 1957, p. 175. 
69 United States v. Greyhound Corp., Civil Action No. 57-C-II07, Complaint No. 2, 
(N.D. Ill., June 27, 1957). Greyhound also operates Greyvan, a household moving company, 
Greyhound Post Houses (restaurants), motels and a rent-a-car service. It has six operating 
divisions (Eastern, Southeastern, Great Lakes, Northland, Florida and Northwest), four 
domestic (Pacific, Southwestern, Atlantic and Richmond), and two Canadian subsidiaries. 
Net income in 1955 was $13,800,000. Bus. WEEK, March 16, 1957, p. 175 at 176, 178, 179. 
70 Greyhound Mergers, I M.C.C. 342 (1936). The individual operating companies 
were absorbed by the major geographical subsidiary groups. 
71 Id. at 343. 
72 Id. at 346. As to subsequent merger decisions, see especially Greyhound Mergers 
1948 and 1949, 55 M.C.C. 237 and 56 M.C.C. 238, and Eastern Canadian Greyhound-
Control and Merger, 55 M.C.C. 189 (1948). 
73 38 M.C.C. 641 (1942). 
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ate over any such routes between those points."74 A passenger 
could still travel from Chicago to Evansville via LaFayette and 
Terre Haute, using three different carriers other than Greyhound, 
and he could travel circuitously on non-Greyhound Lines between 
Chicago and Paducah, but this would not be too attractive. Hence, 
elimination of the "substantial two-line competition ... heretofore 
. . . afforded by the independent existence of Southern with its 
direct lines to Chicago ... would give the Greyhound Companies 
an advantage impossible to meet."75 Eight members of the Com-
mission thought this would not be in the public interest. A later 
purchase by Greyhound of a 40 percent stock interest in Southern 
was declared unlawful and divestiture ordered on the ground that 
even such a minority interest would give Greyhound monopolistic 
power.76 
This decision was followed in Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 
Inc.-Merger-Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., Inc.11 In that case, 
the Antitrust Division, in opposing the merger, observed that 
"the Greyhound Companies have the only integrated national 
bus system." It urged "that, if monopoly in the industry is to be 
avoided, a definite policy to prevent the Greyhound Companies 
from acquiring independent operations, which otherwise could 
some day be molded into an independent competitive bus system, 
should be established."78 A protesting bus company (Missouri-
Pacific Transportation) invoked the Illinois Greyhound case, and 
the Commission, in accepting that decision as controlling prece-
dent, noted that there the last remaining bus competition was to 
be eliminated by merger, while in the present case one of two 
competitors would remain. Nevertheless, the same considerations 
74 Id. at 647. 
75 Id. at 648. The majority found no benefits which would offset "the harmful effects 
resulting from restraint of competition." The dissenters thought that the benefit of 
through one-line service should control. 
76 The Greyhound Corporation-Investigation of Control-The Southern Limited, 
Inc., 45 M.C.C. 59 (1946). At pp. 70-71, reference is made to a contractual arrangement 
by which Southern utilizes Greyhound terminals; denial of this privilege "could cripple" 
Southern, hence, Greyhound should not be given power to control Southern. See also 
Dollar Lines-Purchase-United Stages System, 40 M.C.C. 63 (1944) (acquisition of 
control by Greyhound of small second-class duplicating service as a competitive "fighting 
ship" denied). 
77 39 M.C.C. 721 (1944), affirming 39 M.C.C. 243 (1943). 
' 78Id. at 727. The argument referred to Trailways as a start in the development of 
a competitive system, having "the vulnerability of all loose associations in competition 
with integrated systems." 
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required denial of Southwestern's application. Said the Com-
m1Ss1on: 
"The Trailways Companies east of the Mississippi River do 
not have the territorial coverage, facilities, or schedules equal 
to those maintained by Greyhound Companies in that ter-
ritory; nor, in the aggregate; do they have financial resources 
comparable to those of Greyhound. If the merger were con-
summated, such small advantage as now accrues to Missouri 
Pacific Transportation and Coaches by reason of their some-
what more desirable route west of Memphis would be can-
celed by the latter's coverage of both routes and the elimina-
tion of Coaches. While Missouri Pacific Transportation would 
continue to be largely dependent on Greyhound Companies 
to receive its passengers moving north, south, and east of 
Memphis, it would no longer be likely to receive traffic from 
Greyhound Companies for movement over this route. It is also 
worthy of comment that the result of elimination of Coaches 
as an independent competitor would leave the field solely to a 
railroad-controlled motor bus company and to Greyhound. 
Such a narrowed competitive situation, which already has 
largely been brought about in territory west and north of 
Texarkana and Little Rock and in other sections of the coun-
try through the steady elimination of independent motor bus 
companies by railroads, on the one hand, or Greyhound, on 
the other, is not productive of the healthiest possible passen-
ger-transportation conditions. " 79 
But what about offsetting benefits to the public? The Com-
mission conceded that some advantage through routing over a 
somewhat more direct and desirable route would result for "that 
part of the public which travels via Greyhound," but this was 
outweighed by restraint of competition. The merger would per-
mit Greyhound to drive another wedge into local territory by 
absorption of a relatively small operator who "has been familiar 
with the transportation needs of the numerous small points on its 
routes" and served them satisfactorily. Hence, "preservation of 
the existing competitive situation is more likely to result in effi-
cient local service at points served by Coaches and this applicant 
than would be the case if Southwestern Greyhound were permitted 
to serve this additional territory."80 
79 Id. at 731-732. The "steady elimination of independent motor bus companies" 
could, of course, not have taken place without Commission approval. 
so Id. at 732-733. 
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Antitrust considerations also prevailed in Southeastern Grey-
hound Lines-Control-Lewisburg Bus Lines~ Inc.,81 wherein Divi-
sion 4 denied authority to acquire control of three independent 
bus lines operating in Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Tennessee. 
It found the purpose of these acquisitions was "the desire of South-
eastern to protect itself from the growing competition of Trail-
ways, through elimination of the independence of the three car-
riers and securing an effective monopoly in this territory, and to 
preserve its present profitable control of north-south traffic.''82 
On reconsideration, the Commission affirmed, but permitted a 
merger of two of the bus lines sought to be acquired by South-
eastern in order to enable them to offer more effective competition 
with the Greyhound System.83 Similarly, New England Greyhound 
Lines was not allowed to purchase some of the operating rights of 
Short Line because this "would cause other established services, 
for the first time, to be faced with the aggressive competition of 
a Greyhound Company on traffic movements" between several 
New England cities.84 Short Lines primarily served several points 
in Connecticut; Greyhound would join the routes purchased with 
its interstate network and thus present a mortal threat to Short 
Lines' local competitors, whose financial situation was anyway 
precarious.85 Hence, a majority of Division 4 denied Greyhound's 
application in spite of testimony that Greyhound proposed to add 
early morning and late evening runs not heretofore available 
and desired by some persons in the area. 
In other cases Greyhound's acquisitions were approved in the 
face of vigorous antitrust objections. A significant number of these 
8140 M.C.C. 375 (1946). 
82 Id. at 386. The evidence as to "possible improvements in service" was deemed not 
sufficient to offset this. 
83 45 MC.C. 185 (1946). Greyhound's application for control of the third carrier had 
been withdrawn. The result of this decision could be compared to recent mergers of 
independent automobile manufacturers (Nash-Hudson and Studebaker-Packard) under-
taken for the purpose of saving the independents' survival in their competitive struggle 
with the big three. 
84 The Greyhound Corporation-Control; New England Greyhound Lines, Inc.-
Purchase (Portion)-The Short Line, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 197 at 224 (1953). 
85 The theory of the opinion is not as clear as those discussed earlier. It is said that 
approval of the application would completely change "the competitive balance in the 
area" (id. at 226) and create "an oversupply of transportation service." (id. at 227) The 
latter would, from an antitrust point of view, be irrelevant; but the former expresses 
the policy of §7 of the Clayton Act. Compare The Greyhound Corporation-Control; 
:Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control and Merger-Geronimo Lines, Inc., 56 M.C.C. 415 
(1950) [merger of Pacific Greyhound and Geronimo, an intrastate carrier, disapproved 
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decisions either reversed prior denials by a single division of the 
Commission, or represented the views of a majority from which in-
dividual commissioners dissented. A good illustration of this in-
tense struggle about the role of competition is the early case of 
Richmond Greyhound Lines., Inc.-Control-Peninsula Transit 
Corporation.86 Greyhound's and Peninsula's operations were com-
petitive between Washington and Richmond, Petersburg and Nor-
folk, although Greyhound carried more through traffic. Peninsula 
concentrated on local traffic from and to Baltimore, Washington 
and Richmond and many points not served by Greyhound or any 
other carrier. 87 There was railroad and water transportation in the 
area. 88 Yet, national advertisers for the Greyhound system testified 
that "none of the other areas [served by the Greyhound system] 
exceed the territory served by the Peninsula Transit Corporation 
in the variety and attractiveness of its appeals."89 A representative 
of a community publicity and tourist organization in Norfolk ex-
plained that it was "almost impossible to get into that city unless 
you take a bus or cross the water on the bridge." Hence, he was 
"extremely anxious" to have access to the city "kept wide open for 
a competitive line to come in." He had no objection to National 
Trailways, or any one else other than Greyhound, but insisted it 
ought not "be locked up in one company."00 Other motor carriers, 
all members of Trailways, protested on similar grounds, and even 
Peninsula's president, although he preferred to sell out, admitted 
that his company could maintain competition with Greyhound 
and give good service.91 Greyhound, in reply, referred to a lowering 
of its operating costs and improvement of service which would re-
sult from the merger and, generally, contended that "bus competi-
tion is usually injurious rather than beneficial to the public 
and, ... because a substantial competitor of motor as well as rail 
carriers is the private automobile, ... [the Commission] should ... 
and divestiture ordered of control unlawfully acquired; held that the proviso of 49 
U.S.C. (1~52) §306(1) exempting duly authorized intrastate carrier from the requirement 
of obtaining an I.C.C. certificate for interstate operations does not exempt such carriers 
from the requirements of §5 relating to mergers. Id. at 433]. 
86 5 M.C.C. 394 (1938), affd. in 35 M.C.C. 555 (1940), revd. 36 M.C.C. 747 (1941). 
87 5 M.C.C. 394 at 395 (1938). 
88 35 M.C.C. 555 at 560 (1940). 
89 Id. at 561. 
90 Id. at 562. Similar views were expressed by the town council of Virginia Beach. 
91 Id. at 563. 
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give consideration only to public benefits resulting from ap-
plicant's control of Peninsula and ignore the fact that approval of 
the application would permit applicant to acquire its sole bus 
competitor and ... result in a bus monopoly."92 
Two members of Division 5 rejected this plea in language ring-
ing with anti-monopoly fervor: 
". . . in the absence of a plain declaration to that effect, it 
would be unreasonable to find that Congress intended, in the 
construction of the phrase 'consistent with the public interest,' 
that appropriate consideration should not be given by us to 
the factor of competition. Otherwise, it would seem that every 
application under Section 213 [now section 5] would have 
to be approved by us upon a showing by applicant therein that 
it had a reputation for rendering good service, that it could 
pay the purchase price, and that the latter was not excessive. 
By such a yardstick, the Greyhound interests, because of their 
present position and formidable and ever-increasing finan-
cial resources, would be able to proceed with ease to absorb 
as many of the country's bus lines as they desired. In that con-
nection an officer of the parent corporation· stated: 'I don't 
think that we want to own all the bus lines * * * 20 percent 
would be a reasonable amount for other bus lines to have 
* * * we would like to avoid taking those we would lose 
money on.' Although these statements were later disclaimed 
as facetious, they nevertheless are entitled to consideration 
in the light of the continuous expansion of the Greyhound 
System during the last 10 years.''93 
A year later the full Commission reversed and approved the 
merger. They emphasized Greyhound's proposal "to provide mod-
ern equipment and improve service through elimination of coach 
changes, transfer of baggage, ticket reissuance, and through better 
spacing of schedules and their coordination with ... those of other 
Greyhound Companies. There would also be made available such 
benefits of membership in the Greyhound system as accrue from 
the Greyhound Management Company ... which ... coordinates 
the activities and policies of the various Greyhound Companies 
92 Id. at 564. 
93 Ibid. The report concluded that, in case of approval, future efforts to correct 
an undesirable monopolistic bus situation by authorizing a new operator would be 
foredoomed to failure. Id. at 566. Commissioner Eastman dissented (id. at 567-570) on 
grounds later adopted by the whole Commission. 
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in matters of financing, accounting, safety, traffic, fares, advertis-
ing, legal matters, terminal and garage construction, labor re-
lations, personnel training, new operations, and purchases of equip-
ment, parts, supplies and insurance."94 Another Greyhound sub-
sidiary developed tours by bus to historical points in Virginia, 
which would be nationally advertised by special folders. Some of 
Peninsula's fares would be reduced; drivers would be paid higher 
wages and economies made possible by unification would increase 
earnings. More than 60 witnesses from various communities served 
by Peninsula had testified at further hearings in support of the 
application.95 The traveling public should not be deprived of 
all these benefits merely because "some elimination in competi-
tion" would "possibly" result.96 However, competition with other 
modes of transportation and with other bus lines outside of Nor-
folk would remain.97 Moreover, Greyhound offered to sell to 
Carolina Coach Company, one of the protestants, Peninsula's 
route south of the James River between Petersburg and Suffolk; 
this "would afford means of providing competitive bus service 
between Richmond and Norfolk," and approval of Greyhound's 
acquisition of Peninsula was, therefore, conditioned upon that 
sale.98 
The contrast between this final report extolling the blessings 
of the Greyhound System and the prior report which warned 
against the evil consequences of letting that monster grow bigger 
could hardly be more drastic. Yet, even the final report, like Com-
missioner Eastman's dissent in Division 5, purports to pay its re-
spect to the competitive ideal: (1) There can be no real monopoly, 
as long as there are railroads, passenger boats and, particularly, 
94 36 M.C.C. 747 at 750-751 (1941). 
95 Id. at 751. 
96 Id. at 750. 
97 Ibid. "Except between Richmond and Petersburg, 23 miles, Peninsula provides 
the only motorbus service over its routes, approximately 600 miles, and, of the many 
points served, only the terminal points of Baltimore, Washington, Richmond, Petersburg, 
Suffolk and Norfolk have competitive bus service. Upon approval herein, these points 
would continue to have such service except Norfolk. . . .'' 
98 See Carolina Coach Co. of Virginia-Purchase-Richmond Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 38 M.C.C. 347 (1942), approving the purchase by Carolina Coach Co. and rejecting 
a claim by Virginia Stage Lines which wished to purchase the same operating rights. 
The offer of Stage Lines did not meet the terms of the condition in the previous case. 
A subsequent complaint was dismissed in Virginia Stage Lines v. United States, (W.D. 
Va. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 79. 
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private automobiles competing with bus lines;99 (2) the monop-
olistic effect of the acquisition in a specific area can be avoided 
or, at least, mitigated by restrictive conditions such as the sale by 
the vendee of some of the routes of the vendor to a protestant 
carrier; hence (3) competition among bus lines, though lessened, 
is not eliminated. This is enough to warrant approval if-and this 
seems crucial-(4) the increased efficiency of performance believed 
to result from the acquisition is deemed to outweigh presumptive 
perils of monopoly. 
The last two points in this rationalization of the final Rich-
mond Greyhound decision attempt to comply with the standards 
approved by the Supreme Court in the McLean Trucking Co. 
case.100 On the other hand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
reconcile them with the Illinois and Southwestern Greyhound 
cases discussed above.101 In any event, the latter are outnumbered 
by decisions following the Richmond Greyhound pattern, which, 
as a practical matter, seem to turn on the finding that substantial 
advantages to be derived from the consolidation justify not a com-
plete destruction of all competition, but a sacrifice of a substantial 
part of it which would not be allowable under the antitrust laws.102 
99 MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL (p. a26) gives the following figures 
(in millions of passenger miles and percentage of total): 
1946 
Railroads 66,262 (18.72%) 
Buses 25,576 ( 7.73%) 
Air lines 5,910 ( 1.67%) 
Private automobiles 253,570 (71.70%) 
100 See text at notes 9-19 supra. 
1956 
28,350 ( 4.13%) 
24,900 ( 3.63%) 
25,700 ( 3.'75%) 
605,000 (88.24%) 
101 See text to notes 73-79 supra. The final report in the Southwestern case was 
issued 11 months after the McLean decision; the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas 
referred with approval to the original Richmond Greyhound case, and deplored the 
reversal. See 321 U.S. 67 at 94 (1944). See also Meck and Bogue, "Federal Regulation of 
Motor Carrier Unification," 50 YALE L. J. 1376 at 1393-1397 (1941). 
102 Greyhound Corp.-Control-Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 57 M.C.C. 123 (1950) 
[integration of Greyhound with Southeastern Greyhound and acquisition of control of 
Alaga Coach Line, Inc., approved on the ground of economies in operating costs, safer 
operations, etc. (id. at 150-155)]. "Effective" competition in the territory was assured by 
the grant of a certificate to Trailways (id. at 140-141), and approval was conditioned by 
Greyhound's obligation to "maintain and keep open the present existing junctions and 
gateways, and that any terminal and traffic arrangements now in effect between South-
eastern and non-Greyhound carriers shall be continued .••• " (id. at 155) A vigorous 
antitrust dissent by Commissioner Lee (id. at 158-167) cited the Illinois and Southwestern 
cases and noted the absence of evidence in the record that Trailways had begun operations 
or, if it had, actually provided effective competition. (id. at 165) -Mr. Lee also referred 
to the fact that control of Southeastern had already been acquired by Greyhound without 
waiting for Commission approval and that this should not be condoned. Northland 
Greyhound Lines, lnc.-Purchase-M. M. Liederback, 25 M.C.C. 109 at 112 (1939), reversing 
5 M.C.C. 123 and 215 (1937). Liederback operated only small buses of old design; unlike 
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Particularly noteworthy is Greyhound Gorporation-Gontrol-
Florida Motor Lines Gorporation103 wherein the majority gave 
Greyhound authority to buy the dominant bus line in Florida, 
which had twice as many route miles and twice as much equipment 
as all other Florida bus lines combined. Greyhound, which al-
ready operated in Florida, intended to use this purchase to facili-
tate transfer of equipment from the North to Florida during the 
winter tourist season. Florida was Greyhound's principal connect-
ing carrier; hence, Greyhound urged that the merger "will merely 
continue an arrangement existing over a long period and con-
sequently will not deprive the opposing intervenors of any traffic 
heretofore enjoyed, but, through national advertising and other 
traffic promotional methods more travel by motorbus would be 
generated for all carriers. "104 Greyhound contended that "its very 
size has permitted it to make substantial contributions to the in-
dustry as a whole through pioneering in the design and construc-
tion of motorbusses, the improvement of lubricants, fuels, and 
tires, national advertising, and ... improved station and terminal 
facilities." Denial would "freeze or throttle" its normal growth 
Northland, he had no intrastate rights. Purchase would thus improve service. Competition 
of railroads and private automobiles is a sufficient protection against extortionate fares, 
and regulatory commissions may always admit newcomers if things should get out of 
hand. Commissioners Lee and McManamy dissented on the grounds that the merger 
would give to Greyhound a monopoly of the only through bus routes between Minneapolis 
and Chicago via Wisconsin, vendor's schedule would be eliminated, and Greyhound's 
fare was 20 percent higher than that of vendor. In both cases there were no protestants, 
and this fact is stressed in both reports. 
See also Greyhound Corp.-Control-Eastern Michigan Motorbusses, 36 M.C.C. 413 
at 417 (1941), reversing 25 M.C.C. 483 at 489 (1939). Prior report had approved merger · 
of operating rights and properties of Great Lakes Motor Bus Co. into Eastern Michigan 
Motorbusses and acquisition by Eastern Michigan Transportation Corp. of control of 
the two merged companies, but denied Greyhound's application for permission to acquire 
from Eastern Michigan Transportation the stock of E. M. Motorbusses: "The effect 
of ... [Greyhound's] acquisition would be to add a fourth Greyhound-controlled bus 
line oper:;,.ting between Detroit and Toledo, and a second such line . . . between 
Detroit and Kalamazoo, with no organized competition over the latter route between 
Detroit and Battle Creek, other than the one railroad which owns a substantial stock 
interest in Central [Greyhound]. . . . It is conceivable that the combined efforts of 
these subsidiaries and friendly rail interests would be concentrated as a powerful 
influence in blocking any independent efforts to provide effective competition." The 
full Commission reversed because Greyhound already had a 43.4% interest in Eastern 
Michigan Transportation and there was "no appreciable competition" between Motor-
busses, primarily an intrastate carrier, and the other Greyhound subsidiaries referred 
to by Division 5 which handle only interstate traffic. The elimination of Transportation, 
a mere holding company, and acquisition of direct stock control of Motorbusses by 
Greyhound, would, therefore, not affect the existing competitive situation. 
10a 45 M.C.C. 83 (1946). 
104 Id. at 89. 
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and expansion.105 The mere assertion of such dire consequences 
for Greyhound, coupled with the statement that closer alinement 
with Greyhound would bring substantial advantages in economical 
use and maintenance of equipment and "refinements" of better 
service, apparently swayed the majority to grant the application, 
which had much public support in Florida in spite of the admitted 
fact that Florida Motors had been "efficiently managed."106 
The dissent emphasized that the alleged "substantial advan-
tages" were "couched in such broad general terms as to amount to 
a blank check to Greyhound to acquire any operation which it 
wants."107 Certainly, the report does not reveal much economic 
evidence supporting the finding of "substantial advantages." More-
over, Florida Motors was at the end rather than in the middle of 
Greyhound's routes, and, therefore, "more readily adapted to 
complete independence of action with reasonable prospects of 
continued successful operation ... " than the lines involved in the 
Illinois and Southwestern Greyhound cases whose absorption by 
Greyhound was denied on anti-monopoly grounds.108 The dissent 
thus clearly proved inconsistency with those earlier decisions. In 
any event, the quantity and quality of competition which remained 
after this merger was, probably, smaller than in most other cases. 
The Commission itself has not been insensitive to the charge 
of inconsistency. In Greyhound Corporation-Control and Merger 
-Maine Central Transportation Company,1°9 Division 4 allowed 
Greyhound to acquire Maine Central which was operating at a 
loss, and to assume liability for its notes. Vendor's deficit had 
been borne by its parent railroad. The Antitrust Division and other 
bus lines opposed the merger, invoking the Illinois and South-
western cases. The report, citing McLean, notes that the protesting 
carriers had presented no evidence that the proposed transaction 
4 'would appreciably worsen their position, financially, or prevent 
them from fulfilling their common-carrier responsibilities," and 
that Greyhound was willing to accept a condition requiring it to 
maintain and keep open the present use of its terminals by other 
motor-bus companies for the sale of tickets and interchange of 
passengers. The Illinois Greyhound case was distinguished on the 
105 Id. at 87-88. 
100 Id. at 93. 
101 Id. at 95. 
10s Id. at 96-97. 
109 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,570 (1956). 
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ground that it epitomized the Commission's policy "to deny pro-
posed unification where monopoly in a section would be created 
or extended," but denials on that basis were called for only when 
"there was an affirmative showing that the available traffic would 
support competitive operations, particularly as to long distance 
movements." The declining traffic in the Maine Central territory 
made such a showing impossible.110 This distinction correctly re-
flects the basic policy of the Motor Carrier Act to guard against 
excessive competition by preventing oversupply of transporta-
tion.111 Hence, it may be regrettable that this has not been con-
sistently applied. Indeed, in both the Florida and Richmond Grey-
hound cases mergers were approved in spite of such an "affirm-
ative showing." Perhaps that showing was disregarded in those 
cases because of the strong public support in favor of the applica-
tions. 
Of course, a failure by protesting carriers to show how a pro-
posed merger would harm their operations would usually indicate 
the merger would have no anti-competitive results and, therefore, 
require approval even under the anti-merger provision of the 
Clayton Act.112 
Greyhound's continuous expansion was thus fostered by the 
Commission's merger decisions.113 Presumably there can be no 
110 In accord: Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.-Purchase-R. W. Lee, 36 M.C.C. 
753 at 756 (1941), Commissioner Porter dissented; The Greyhound Corp.-Purchase-B. 
C. Motor Transportation, Ltd., 60 M.C.C. 643 (1954). 
111See House Hearings, note 21 supra, p. 27. 
112 A good example is Greyhound Corp.-Control; Pacific Greyhound Lines, 50 
M.C.C. 123 (1947) (approval of acquisition of two independent bus lines). Protestant 
objected that it would be cut off from all connections except Greyhound, but the routes 
of the two independents were not competitive and there was no substantial interchange 
between them and protestant. Simplification of corpgrate structure as a ground justifying 
merger: Greyhound Corp.-Control; Southwestern Greyhound Lines-Control-North-
eastern Missouri Greyhound Lines, 50 M.C.C. 441 (1948), 55 M.C.C. 540 (1949); Greyhound 
Corp.-Merger-West Ridge Transportation Co. etc., 56 M.C.C. 349 (1950); Greyhound 
Corp.-Control; Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control, 65 M.C.C. 347 (1955). See also Pan-
American Greyhound Lines-Control and Merger-Pan-American Bus Lines, 38 M.C.C. 
433 (1942); Greyhound Corp.-Control-Pacific Greyhound Lines-Control-Oregon Motor 
Stages, 55 ,M.C.C. 321 (1948) (purchase of 25% stock interest involving actual power of 
control approved in the absence of any protest). Prior to Commission approval, all in-
terested parties must be given an opportunity to be heard, 49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(2)(b). The 
absence of protestants may, therefore, justify the inference that competitors, if any, would 
not feel prejudiced .by the acquisition. Compare United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 
U.S. 417 at 449 (1920). 
113 For a detailed account of all Greyhound acquisitions see MooDY's 1957 °TRANS• 
PORTATION -MANUAL, pp. 1298-1300. See also County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 
412 (1958). (Greyhound's proposed transfer of commuter service to newly-organized sub-
sidiary not an acquisition within §5). 
1958] MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS 1261 
quarrel with the policy of having strong and efficient nation-wide 
systems of bus carriers for intercity traffic.114 However, the ques-
tion arises as to whether this policy has not been carried too far 
because there is no other integrated bus system comparable to 
Greyhound.115 In fact, during 1955 the Greyhound System re-
ceived gross operating revenues amounting to about 62 percent 
of the annual gross realized by all Class I intercity bus operators 
and Greyhound buses accounted for approximately 65 percent 
of the passenger miles of Class I carriers.116 This dominant position 
of Greyhound117 was the basis of a complaint by the Antitrust 
114 The declaration of the "National Transportation Policy" in §1 of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899, note preceding 49 U.S.C. (1952) §301 states that "sound 
economic conditions in transportation" should be fostered "to the end of developing, 
coordinating and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway and 
rail ••• adequate to meet the needs of commerce of tlie United States. • • ." For a 
detailed account of the legislative history see OPPENHEIM, THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION 
POUCY AND INTER-CAluuER. COMPETITIVE RATES 4-15 (1945). 
115 The National Trail ways Bus System is a voluntary association of 42 independent 
intercity motorbus carriers operating in 44 states and operating in 1955 over 73,368 route 
miles. Its "principal purpose is to assist its members in more effectively competing with 
the Greyhound system." 59 M.C.C. 233 at 235. See TAFF, COMMERCIAL MoToR TRANSPORTA· 
TION, rev. ed., pp. 598, 599 (1955). Transcontinental Bus System, Inc., a member of Trail-
ways, incorporated in 1947, conducts long-line and local motorbus operations in the Mid-
west, Mid-South, Southwest and Far West. Its numerous acquisitions are described in 
MOODY'S 1957 TRANSPORTATION MANUAL, p. 1313, and 50 M.C.C. 193 (1947); 50 M.C.C. 
305, 525 (1948); 55 M.C.C. 31 (1948); 57 M.C.C. 323 (1951); 59 M.C.C. 233 at 235 (1953) 
(Antitrust Division's objection withdrawn when applicant-vendee agreed that presently 
existing routes, junctions and gateways be maintained); 59 M.C.C. 491 (1953) and 60 
M.C.C. 157 (1954). The following comparative data for 1956 are from Moody's at 1301 
and 1314: 
Buses owned 
Bus Miles Operated 
Miles of routes 














116 Complaint (paragraph 7) in United States v. The Greyhound Corporation, Civil 
Action No. 57-C-1107, filed June 27, 1957 in N.D. m. Class I intercity bus carriers are 
those with annual gross operating revenues of $200,000 or more; they do not normally 
compete with smaller operators whose certificated routes are few and short. Passenger 
miles means the number of miles travelled by all passengers in buses operated by such 
carriers. 
117 For an additional example of the Commission's awareness of monopoly dangers 
see West Coast Bus Lines, Ltd., Common Carrier Application, 41 M.C.C. 269 at 285 (1942) 
(dissatisfaction with Greyhound's service r'Two accounts were given of continued driving, 
by both Greyhound and Dollar Lines, in excess of 50 miles through several stops without 
cleaning up after a passenger had become ill and vomited in a bus. A resident of Ashland, 
Ore., traveling to San Francisco over Greyhound ••• on arrival late at night found that 
his baggage had apparently ibeen put off in Oakland. Notwithstanding, Greyhound em-
ployees indifferently refused to do anything about it until the next day .••• Several 
instances of passengers left behind at mealstops were described.'1 resulted in granting 
of certificate to West Coast). 
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Division charging Greyhound with violations of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The consent decree entered in June 1957118 forbade 
Greyhound to limit or prevent any person from selling buses to 
any third person, 119 to divide territories with any other bus opera-
tor, to seek or knowingly receive prices, or services in connection 
with the purchase of buses or fuel which are not available to other 
bus operators, to condition the use by a bus operator of any Grey-
hound-owned or controlled terminal upon an agreement to refrain 
from competing with Greyhound or discriminate against any bus 
operator in the provision of usual terminal services, to have more 
than one-third representation on the board of directors of the Na-
tional Bus Traffic Association, the major rate bureau in the inter-
city bus business, and to evict any bus operator from any Grey-
hound terminal on grounds other than non-compliance with rea-
sonable tenancy agreements. In this manner the Department of J us-
tice sought to prevent abuse120 of the power inherent in Grey-
hound's bigness after the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
permitted Greyhound to grow to its present size. 
All told, it seems clear that the majority of the Commission 
seemed inclined in the Greyhound cases to attach greater signifi-
cance to present "substantial benefits" of integration than to po-
tential future evils of monopoly, and that it was willing to pay the 
price of considerable diminution of competition for bringing 
118 1957 CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,'756. 
119 The complaint had charged that Greyhound "entered into contracts with General 
Motors which conferred upon the defendant exclusive and preferential rights to the 
purchase of buses manufactured by General Motors . • • in exchange for commitments 
by defendant •.. to purchase a certain percentage of its total bus requirements from 
General Motors." In 1955 an action for damages by Greyhound against General Motors 
for delivery of defective buses was settled. Greyhound's president was quoted as saying 
that he was "not tied to the apronstrings of any bus manufai:turer." Bus. WEEK, March 
16, 1957, pp. 179, 180. New long-distance passenger buses are being manufactured by 
Mack Trucks, Inc. which hope to compete with General Motors for a Greyhound order.· 
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1957, p. 52:2. A complaint against General Motors for attempted 
monopolization of the manufacture of buses is pending in the Eastern District of Mich-
igan, United States v. G.M., Civil No. 15816. Apparently arrangements between General 
Motors and Greyhound made in the late 1920's required Greyhound to take 75% of its 
buses from G.M. The problem of monopolistic domination of a carrier by a leading 
manufacturer of transportation equipment was involved in C. & R. Trans., Inc.-Control-
Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc., 60 M.C.C. 173 at 200 (1954) (Fruehauf Trailer Co. permitted 
to become principal preferred stockholder in reorganized and enlarged Keeshin System 
subject to conditions: Fruehauf not to dispose of its stock without prior Commission ap-
proval, no person affiliated with Fruehauf to serve as director, officer or employee of the 
carrier, and charter provisions requfring consent by 70% of preferred stock for certain · 
corporate. actions shall be cancelled). 
120 The consent decree contains, of course, no admission of law violations on the 
part of Greyhound. 
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about what it believed to be such benefits. In some instances, the 
findings in this respect were vague or disputable;121 certainly, with-
out elaborate and specific economic evidence relevant to this cru-
cial point, accommodation of antitrust and regulatory policies be-
comes a meaningless abdication of the former in favor of the latter. 
However, the Commission has always been aware of its obligation 
to undertake such an adjustment and, at least in some situations, 
resolved the conflict in favor of competition. Perhaps, the con-
tradictions noted above were inevitable in the absence of more 
specific legislative directions. 
IV. END-TO-END TRUCKING MERGERS 
In reply to a questionnaire submitted to it in 1955 by the 
Senate Select Committee on Small Business, the Commission re-
ferred to merger applications by motor carriers of property as 
follows: "It is not believed that the number involving substantially 
competing carriers is large. The typical transaction is the merger 
or unification of connecting carriers."122 
Cooperation between such carriers is usually called "inter-
lining." Either loaded equipment is leased by the orginating car-
rier to a carrier having authority in the area of the shipment's 
destination, or the shipment is transferred physically from the 
truck of the initial carrier to the truck of the connecting carrier for 
delivery at destination by the latter.123 This practice often causes 
delay; at times shipments are misplaced, and there are loss or dam-
age claims. Hence, carriers engaged in substantial interlining be-
tween themselves may wish to eliminate these difficulties by insti-
tuting through-service; this could be done most effectively by unifi-
cation of their separate and independent enterprises in what the 
Supreme Court in the McLean Trucking case called an "end-to-end 
consolidation. "124 Although this would create a different entity with 
normally greater strength than that possessed by its constituent 
121 The Florida case, text to note 107 supra; the Liederback case, note 102 supra. 
Compare the detailed findings on this point in the McLean Trucking case, text to notes 
IO and 11 supra. 
122 Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, p. 330. Emphasis supplied. 
123 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 358. 
124 Note 13 supra. See also 38 M.C.C. 137 at 144 (1942): "The carriers involved [in 
the merger challenged by McLean Trucking Co.] at present interchange a substantial 
amount of freight between themselves and with other carriers." For a detailed enumera-
tion of the inefficiency and inexpedience of interlining, see Adams Report, note 58 supra, 
pp. 358-361. 
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parts prior to unification, the nature of the operation would remain 
substantially the same as before except for the improvement result-
ing from through-service. By contrast, unification of carriers with 
no or- negligible previous interchange arrangements would present 
a very different picture of an entirely new service where none had 
existed before. The danger of diversion of traffic from competitors 
is likely to be greater in the latter type of merger than in the 
former; indeed, in the former there might be only little or no 
diversion. Of course, under the McLean Trucking formula the 
Commission must determine whether public advantage from im-
proved performance made possible by a merger is more important 
than reduction of competition, if any; hence, we might expect that 
end-to-end consolidations of interlining carriers could be approved 
more readily than other mergers. 
These considerations are reflected in the leading case of Pacific 
Intermountain Express Co.-Control and Purchase-Keeshin 
Freight Lines, Inc.125 Pacific, hereafter referred to as P.I.E., was 
in 1950 operating over 10,513 regular routes in the area between 
the California coast and Chicago and St. Louis. It owned 756 
units of equipment, had leased 79 additional units for long-term 
use. It maintained terminals in most of the cities in its territory, 
and the average length of its hauls was 1500 miles. Its average 
shipment weighed 660 pounds, and its operating revenue had 
increased from $1,000,000 in 1941 to $14,000,000 in 1949. 
The Keeshin System, which P.I.E. sought to acquire, coveted 
15,560 miles in territory extending from Minneapolis, Des Moines 
and St. Louis to Boston and Washington, D.C. It owned 1,412 uniu. 
of equipment, and the average length of its haul was 215 miles. 
Its operating revenues were smaller than those of P .I.E., but 
substantial.126 
The two systems come together in Chicago and St. Louis, but 
the volume of freight interchanged between them was "negligible." 
However, P.I.E. interlined considerable freight with Keeshin's 
motor carrier competitors who opposed the merger. There was no 
doubt that all east-bound freight delivered by P.I.E. to these pro-
testants at Chicago and St. Louis would be lost by them in case 
125 57 -M.C.C. 341 (1950), affd. 57 M.C.C. 467 (1951). 
· 126 $10,500,000 is the figure for 1950 given in the Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 43. 
Net income after taxes for P.I.E. and Keeshin in 1949 was $1,000,755 and $142,834 respec-
tively. 57 M.C.C. 341 at 347 and 351 (1950). 
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of approval; 127 by the same token, P.l.E. would be in a position to 
divert to itself west-bound traffic which it now receives from east-
ern carriers.128 The twelve protesting motor carriers indicated that 
this would disrupt the competitive balance in their eastern ter-
ritories; some of them explicitly stated that they could not sur-
vive these inevitable consequences of the proposed merger.129 
Similarly, protesting railroads competing with P .I.E. and Keeshin 
expressed apprehension that the transaction would deprive them 
of vitally needed transcontinental traffic.130 
The Commission denied approval on the ground that the pro-
posal 
"goes beyond a mere unification of the operations of two go-
ing concerns, with the elimination of interchange formerly 
carried on between them. As stated, there has been no ap-
preciable amount of traffic interchanged between P .I.E. and 
the Keeshin Companies. To the extent that P.I.E. would 
institute a single-line, single ownership, through operation 
between points now served by it and points now served by 
... Keeshin ... it would be a new competitive service, not 
distinguishable, to this extent, from an extension of its service 
through securing new operating authority. It would be a new 
service competitive with existing carriers operating wholly 
within the respective territories now served by P .I.E. and . . . 
Keeshin . . . , depriving those carriers of traffic which they 
now transport and interchange, and would also be compet-
itive with existing carriers which operate between points in 
the territory served by P .I.E. on the one hand, and points in 
· territory served by ... Keeshin ... on the other, through the 
rendition of a through service not heretofore available."131 
The denial was affirmed on reconsideration. The Commission 
noted that "public interest" under section 5 was not necessarily 
identical with the requirement of "public convenience and neces-
sity" under section 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act132 for 
127 57 M.C.C. 341 at 379 (1950). 
12s Id. at 376. 
129 Id. at 371-377. 
130 Id. at 368-371. The American Trucking Associations took the position that the 
railroads are not entitled to protection against motor carrier competition, 57 M.C.C. 
467 at 468 (1951). 
13157 M.C.C. 341 at 379, 380 (1950). 
132 49 U.S.C. (1952) §307. A real distinction is pointed out in McLean Trucking Co. 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 at 78, 79 (1944) (inadequacy of existing service is not a 
prerequisite for approval of a merger, but, usually, must be shown before certificates 
may be granted to newcomers). 
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grants of certificates; the statement in the prior report that author-
ization of this merger would be tantamount to certification of an 
extension of service for P .I.E. should, therefore, not be understood 
as blurring the distinction. Rather, it was intended to stress the 
Commission's duty in merger cases 
"to consider . . . if such proposed new unified service would 
adversely affect to any substantial extent the continuance, 
efficiency, and economy of existing carrier services, to tlie 
detriment of the public, whether it would result in offsetting 
advantages to the public and whether approval or disapproval 
would more nearly conform with the policy of Congress de-
clared in the national transportation policy."133 
In this instance, elimination of interchange expense and delay, 
reduction in insurance c_osts and other economies and greater 
job security for employees134 were deemed insufficient to offset the 
threat to other efficient motor carriers by consolidation of two so 
dissimilar operations as P .I.E. and Keeshin. Commissioner Knud-
son suggested in a concurring opinion that the creation of a trans-
continental trucking system run by what would become "one of 
the nation's largest and most powerful motor carriers" was dis-
turbing in its effects "upon certain well-developed American 
concepts ... relating to so-called 'antitrust policies.' "135 
Although the anti-merger law was not mentioned, and the 
two companies sought to be merged were not in competition with 
each other, the denial of P.I.E.'s ·application was based on the 
idea that a new service would be created with the probability, 
nay certainty, of a substantial lessening of competition in the 
eastern territory served by Keeshin. The evidence as to the diver-
sion of traffic with possibly lethal effects of the transaction on the 
protesting motor carriers was ample, and the Commission con-
sidered it thoroughly. In other words, on this record it was easy 
to conclude that the showing as to the anti-competitive effects 
outweighed advantages to shippers from the institution of through 
service; indeed, there was no shipper support for this application. 
The Commission has been charged with erosion of the doctrine 
of this case by subsequently permitting P .I.E., already a leader in 
183 57 M.C.C. 467 at 470 (1951). 
134 Id. at 359-361. 
135 Id. at 474. Mr. Knudson observed tbat no such system existed in 1940 when the 
national transportation policy was declared. Greyhound did exist tben. See text at note 
70 supra. 
1958] MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS 1267 
the industry,136 to acquire several carriers operating in its western 
territory.137 However, the Commission's reports in those later 
P .I.E. cases indicate that there was support by the shippers and 
no evidence as to adverse effect of the transactions there proposed 
on competing protestants.138 In fact, section 5 cases involving other 
companies seeking to institute single-line through service have 
followed the P.l.E.-Keeshin doctrine by denying approval in an-
alogous situations.139 The notion that a proposed unification would 
136 In the third quarter of 1956, P.I.E. occupied second place in gross earnings and 
first place in net earnings among general freight carriers. S. Hearings Before Select 
Committee on Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st 
sess., p. 8 (1957). 
137 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 262, and cases discussed on pp. 262-270. See also 
pp. 225, 226. 
138 The most important of these mergers was P.I.E.-Control-West Coast Fast Freight, 
Inc., 60 M.C.C. 301 at 318-319 (1954), Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 263, 264. 
Protestants proposed restrictions to preclude interlining between vendor and vendee at 
points served by protestants, which applicants accepted. Some of the companies acquired 
were not carriers of general freight. In MC-F-5984 (Adams Report, pp. 264, 265), protestant 
was a large carrier, whose size and financial strength was deemed sufficient to enable it 
to make the necessary adjustments. In MC-F-6199 (Adams Report, pp. 268, 269) it was 
said "that the mere apprehension by competing carriers that they might lose some 
traffic does not alone warrant denial .... " The protests of railroads in all these cases 
were disregarded. Shippers supported the applicants. 
139 E. W. King-Control; The Mason &: Dixon Lines, Inc.-Purchase-W. D. Sartain 
and J. R. O'Guin, 60 M.C.C. 331 at 353, 354 (1954), reversing prior report in 58 M.C.C. 
301 (1952) (authority to purchase operating rights denied; not every shipper entitled 
to direct single-line service to all points when prompt service is being provided). "Cook 
[protestant] not only would lose the westbound traffic it now receives from Mason &: 
Dixon, which, during the first 6 months of 1952, aggregated almost 940 tons, but most 
of the traffic moving between Nashville and Memphis, constituting 48 per cent of its 
system tonnage and 48 per cent of its system gross operating revenues •.. would become 
vulnerable to Mason &: Dixon's solicitation." Similar figures were given as to other 
protestants. Fay V. Watson-Control; Watson Bros. Transport Co.-Purchase (Portion)-
West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 745 at 759 (1951); A. B. Crichton, Sr.-Control; 
Super Service Motor Freight Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 60 
M.C.C. 389 (1954) (denying purchase of operating rights on authority of P.I.E.-Keeshin 
case). Complaint by applicant-vendee dismissed in Super Service Motor Freight Co. v. 
United States and I.C.C., 10 F.C.C. 80,995 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) [plaintiff wanted to purchase 
a portion of Hayes' rights to obtain direct single-line through-service between eastern 
points and Memphis, via Nashville, to alleviate congested terminal conditions at Nash. 
ville. Div. 4 approved (57 M.C.C. 715), the full Commission reversed (58 M.C.C. 137), 
then reversed itself and reinstated the approval, but finally, on the basis of detailed 
evidence adduced by new protestants, denied (60 ,M.C.C. 389)]. These vacillations indicate 
the desirability for immediate protests and presentation of evidence by all affected 
competitors. Cf. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co.-Purchase-Boulder Truck Service, Inc., 
12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,802 (1956) (fact that interlining developed between applicants 
subsequent to commencement of negotiations for sale of rights deemed irrelevant. 
Protests by railroads serving all points in the territory held sufficient, even in absence 
of showing of possible losses); J. E. Faltin-Purchase (Portion)-C. B. Gray, 50 M.C.C. 
364 at 370 (1948); E.W.A. Peake-Control; Consolidated Freightways, Inc.-Purchase 
(Portion)-Arrowhead Freight Lines, 59 M.C.C. 165 at 184 (1953): "Vendee, a financially 
stronger carrier than vendor, which has performed a limited service in the territory and 
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bring about a radical change of service which would threaten com-
petition was also stressed as a ground for denying applications by 
regular-route vendees and vendors operating over irregular 
routes.140 
As noted above, these denials rest on the factual determination 
or, rather, prognostication in each case that competitors as a group 
could not long survive consummation of the transaction and that 
the reasonable needs of shippers are taken care of. At this point, 
the antitrust policy of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the regula-
tory purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to prevent over-
supply of motor~carrier service seem to coincide: The elimination 
of competitors would lead to monopoly, and, until that is achieved, 
the struggle among rivals for the available business would become 
so fierce that service would deteriorate. The Commission has the 
duty to prevent this. 
over the routes involved, would doubtless conduct a more aggressive operation and 
attract substantial traffic now enjoyed by [protestants], which they can ill afford to lose. 
No evidence was submitted which would indicate that vendee expects to develop new 
sources of tonnage and it is therefore logical to conclude that the traffic anticipated would 
be diverted from protestants and other carriers operating in the area." For more recent 
decisions involving Consolidated Freightways and numerous pending applications for 
approval, see I.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 77, and 71st ANN. REP. 55. See also Amer. Red Ball 
Transit-Purchase-B & H Transfer and Storage, 9 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[32,408 (1952). 
Evidence shows "that intervenors, especially Rocky Ford, cannot well afford to lose any 
of the business they now enjoy, particularly California freight destined to Eastern points." 
The case is criticized in Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 371-373. Among the protestants 
were most of the major nationwide van lines, who did not need protection, and a carrier 
should not be denied to take the risk of competition. The latter ground may be incon-
sistent with the regulatory theory of the act to prevent excessive competition from over-
supply of transportation. The former, in connection with the sentence quoted above, 
may indicate that the Commission feared the destruction of smaller competitors; in any 
event, the Commission's explanation should have ,been more elaborate on this point. 
140 Shein's Express-Purchase (Portion)-W. Stillwell, 56 M.C.C. 711 at 714 (1950): 
"Vendees have been interlining with connecting carriers at Philadelphia :between 30,000 
and 60,000 pounds of south-bound traffic per day ... were the transaction to be ..• con-
summated, existing carriers would lose substantially all of the traffic now received by them 
from vendees at Philadelphia .•.. " Appeal against denial dismissed in Shein v. United 
States, (D.C. N.J. 1951) 102 F. Supp. 320 (vendee-plaintiff proposed radical change in vend-
or's pattern of operations; plaintiff could not have qualified for certificate of convenience 
and necessity, should not attain same end by indirection through merger). In accord: 
Falwell v. United States, (W.D. Va. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 71, affd. per curiam 330 U.S. 807 
(1947) [complaint to set aside I.C.C. order (40 M.C.C. 439) dismissed]; Houff Transfer, 
Inc. v. United States, (W.D. Va. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 851. The Commission defined carriers 
with irregular routes radial service as persons undertaking transportation "from a fixed 
base point or points or places located within such radial area as shall have been . • • 
authorized .•• or from any point within such radial area to such carrier's fixed base 
point or points." Regular route service is transportation between fixed termini. Falwell 
v. United States, supra, 69 F. Supp. at 77. See 49 U.S.C. (1952) §304(b) authorizing the 
Commission to establish "reasonable classifications • • • of groups of carriers.'' 
1958] MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS 1269 
It follows that mergers or purchases of operating rights will 
be approved in those cases where no threat to the survival of pro-
testing competitors is found,141 and this, as noted earlier, is likely, 
though not limited to situations where interlining of traffic be-
tween vendor and vendee preceded their application. Thus, in 
Baltimore Transfer Co. v. I.C.C.142 plaintiffs' complaint to set 
aside approval of a purchase was dismissed. Vendee, Quinn Freight 
Lines, "one of the larger motor carriers operating along the East-
ern Seaboard" as a common carrier of general commodities over 
regular routes from Boston to Baltimore, transported volume 
shipments destined to Washington, D.C., Richmond, and other 
points in Virginia. Vendors' (Neale and Wadkins) routes covered 
the territory from Baltimore to Virginia. Half a million pounds 
a week, amounting to one fifth of vendee's total tonnage moving 
south through Baltimore, was there interlined with one of the 
vendors; hence, the proposed purchase would eliminate delays, 
losses and damage. Shippers supported the application, but plain-
tiffs, carriers competing with vendors, protested; they urged that 
their service was adequate, they could accommodate additional 
freight and would lose substantial traffic. Observing that competi-
tion in the territory was substantial, but that vendors' operations 
have had little consequence for plaintiffs-protestants, the court 
said: 
"The opposing carriers do not serve directly a very large 
portion of the area in the five Virginia counties embraced in 
Neale's certificate. They have no interline freight with ven-
dors and not much with Quinn, the vendee, Brooks [ one of 
the plaintiffs] having received only some 80,000 pounds from 
the latter between January 1 and June 30, 1951. Complete 
data was not given with respect to the volume of New England 
141 In J. W. Ringsby-Control; Ringsby Trucklines, Inc.-Control-Northem Trans-
portation Co., 58 M.C.C. 594 at 598 (1952), the Com.mission said: "We do not consider 
the views expressed in the PIE case as necessarily requiring denial of every section 5 
application, merely because a single-line through service would result, and because com-
peting carriers contend that they would be adversely affected by such a service. The 
right to perform single-line through service results from every physical unification of 
rights where a common point is served. Each case can and must be determined on the 
basis of the evidence of record, and where ••• the record affirmatively establishes that 
the proposed plan of operations would meet a public need and that the public interest 
would best be served by the proposed common control, the application may properly 
be approved, especially where the competing carriers have failed to establish that their 
operations or services would be prejudiced to any material degree." 
142 (D.C. Md. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 558, affd. per curiam 346 U.S. 890 (1953), rehearing 
den. 347 U.S. 908 (1954). 
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tonnage which East Coast and Transfer [the other plaintiffs] 
interline. Out of more than three and one-half million pounds 
transported by Brooks to or from Richmond, on three days in 
1951, only a little more than 100,000 pounds originated at 
or was destined to points in Connecticut, Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island. The bulk of vendee's tonnage originates in 
Massachusetts, and the opposing carriers have shared very 
little in the portion moving into vendors' territory."143 
Under these circumstances, while it was "quite likely that Quinn, 
the vendee, being an aggressive carrier, will divert some freight 
from the opposing carriers, this fact alone is not sufficient reason 
for denying the application; and weighing the evidence on both 
sides the Commission stated it was not convinced that operations 
by Quinn, the vendee, under the unified rights would so hurt 
the opposing carriers as to impair their ability to continue per-
forming their obligations as common carriers."144 
Indeed, the court endorsed the Commission's rejection of 
plaintiffs' contention that the proposed transaction would not be 
in the public interest because it would take some business away 
from them: "As to this, suffice it to say that it is not inconsistent 
with the public interest if, in order to provide the public with 
improved service, such would affect adversely the revenue of a 
protesting carrier."145 
The distinction between adverse effect on protestants' revenues 
on the one hand and impairment of ability to continue as com-
mon carriers on the other seems to be crucial; the former is con-
143 114 F. Supp. 558 at 563. On p. 562 the court, summarizing the (unreported) 
findings of the Commission, states that plaintiff Transfer "would be subject to sub• 
stantial competition from vendee," but that Transfer has been successful in spite of 
"substantial carriers whose routes practically parallel its own." 
144 Id. at 563. Emphasis added. 
145 Id. at 564-565, citing Trans-American Freight Lines, Inc.-Purchase-H. D. Gor-
man, 5 M.C.C. 712 (1938); Super Service Motor Freight Co.-Purchase-Selman & Junkins, 
45 M.C.C. 432 (1947) and N.C. Purdie Corp.-Purchase (Portion)-Hoffman's Motor 
Transportation, 57 M.C.C. 790 (1951). The court also approved the granting of temporary 
authority to Quinn pursuant to §210a(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act in view of the 
fact that Neale had died and his widow was unable to carry on the trucking business. 
The purchases approved in Eastern Freightways, 60 M.C.C. 133 at 136 (1954), and Ander-
son ,Motor Service v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 577 at 581, were similarly 
motivated. Truckers in their fifties and sixties with all their assets tied up in the business 
frequently try to sell out to other lines. See S. Hearings Before Select Committee on 
Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 160 
(1957). See also Stone's Express Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 
955, dismissed as moot 350 U.S. 906 (1955) [limitation of temporary authority to maximum 
duration of 180 days (49 U.S.C. (1952) §310a(b)) not superseded by Administrative 
Procedure Act §9b. 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1008(b)]. 
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sistent with a finding that the proposed end-to-end unification 
increases while the latter lessens competition.146 Accordingly, the 
Commission has rationalized its approval of numerous acquisitions 
of this type on the theory that opposing carriers are not entitled 
to immunity from competition; hence, their protests have no merit 
when, in addition to the obvious advantage to shippers resulting 
from elimination of interlining, present and potentially available 
business in the area is sufficient to stimulate them into making the 
necessary adjustments to a more vigorous competitive situation.147 
146 See the explanation by Dr. Adams that vertical or end-to-end mergers may either 
increase or lessen competition in S. Hearings, note 145 supra, p. 205. 
147 Anderson Motor Service, Inc. v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 577 
at 581 (protestants' efficiency shown by low operating ratios and rising profits); Wasie-
Control; Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Bridgeways, Inc., 60 M.C.C. 
229 at 278-280 (1954) (P.I.E. case distinguished, support by numerous shippers, active 
and continuous interlining, protestant motor carriers had improved their operating 
ratios and increased their assets, protests by railroads (pp. 269-271) disregarded); Suther-
land&: Palmer-Control; Middle Atlantic Trans. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-United Trucking 
Co., 7 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[31,936 (1950) (competitors are large, in five months of vendee's 
operation under temporary authority intervenors had lost only one account); Prucka-
Purchase (Portion)-Overnite Express, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 69 at 76 (1950) (usual formula 
that some competing carriers will lose some traffic when a larger or more aggressive 
carrier takes over operations of a smaller one); Interstate Motor Lines-Control and 
Merger-Great American Dispatch, Inc., 58 M.C.C. 775 (1953) (not a "new" service 
because of substantial interlining between vendor and vendee, no adverse effect on 
protestants); Arkansas Motor Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Smock Transp. Co., 
55 M.C.C. 701 (1949) and A. B. Crichton-Control; Super Service Motor Freight Co.-
Purchase-Selman &: Junkins, 45 M.C.C. 432 (1947) (same, no evidence that available 
traffic would not support single-line through service in addition to services of other 
carriers, "some increase in competition in the area may result"); Keeshin-Control; 
Conklin Truck Line, Inc.-Purchase-Wilhelm Transport Co., 59 M.C.C. 763 at 775-776 
.(1954) (merger between carriers connecting at Chicago approved in spite of very little 
previous interlining between vendor and vendee; protestants would face new competition 
only at some points); Mid-Continent Freight Lines-Purchase-Hanson Motor Express, 
Inc., 65 M.C.C. 312 (1955) (vendee's regular routes connected with those of vendor for 
the eastbound delivery of specified commodities at 6 towns and for westbound delivery 
of general commodities at the same towns. "[V]endee now authorized to deliver and 
pick-up shipments at St. Louis and the principal points served by vendor, ••• acquisi-
tion of the rights of vendor would not permit it to render any greater service at St. 
Louis ..•• " P.I.E. case distinguished, protestants' operations have been increasingly 
profitable, their fears are "speculative and conjectural"); Wieck-Control; St. Louis-
Nashville Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Ziffrin Truck Lines, 59 M.C.C. 339 (1953) 
and Navajo Freight Lines-Purchase-M. M. Comstock, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,657 
(1956) (protestants larger than vendee, hence their objections seem groundless); Dalby-
Control; T.I.M.E., Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-W. 0. Harrington, 60 M.C.C. 381 at 387 
(1954), reversing 59 M.C.C. 621 (1953), Commissioner Mahaflie dissenting (no interlining 
prior t9 beginning of merger-negotiations, :but "increased competition would be likely 
to stimulate all carriers in this area toward a more efficient and improved service and 
thereby attract additional traffic over comparatively new and desirable routes to the 
ultimate benefit of all participating carriers"). Emphasis added. Ringsby Truck Lines, 
Inc.-Control-Northern Transport Co., 58 M.C.C. 594 at 598 (1952), affirming 58 M.C.C. 
235 (1952) (failure of protestants to show material prejudice); D.C. Hall Co.-Purchase-
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By the same token, railroads have no standing to complain about 
approval of a motor-carrier acquisition on the sole ground that 
"the motor carriers ... as a combination under joint control with 
adequate financial backing, offer stronger competition to the rail-
roads than they did previously."148 
The difficulty of determining in many cases whether approval 
of a proposed acquisition would merely make things tougher for 
competitors rather than threaten them with extinction should be 
Hall and Hall Transport, Inc., 70 M.C.C. 233 (1956) (same); Watson Brothers Transp. 
Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Powell Brothers Trucklines, 57 M.C.C. 661 at 671 (1951) 
(vendor's rights not dormant when he operated "on a scale commensurate with its 
financial resources, facilities, and the traffic tendered to it." Protestants "ability to con-
tinue to perform their common-carrier obligations" not affected); Garrett Freightlines, 
Inc.-Purchase-The Moab Garage Co., 58 M.C.C. 757 at 772-773 (1953) (protestants' 
operating ratios, revenues and connections with other carriers found such as to preclude 
serious detriment to them). Finding of Div. 4 that vendee could not bear financial 
burdens of the transaction reversed in 59 M.C.C. 615 at 618 (1953); Boyd Truck Lines, 
Inc.-Purchase-Denver-Limon-Burlington Transfer Co., 65 M.C.C. 433 (1955), modifying 
65 -M.C.C. 75 (1955) (prior report approved purchase subject to condition that unified 
rights should exclude right to transport shipments originating at Kansas City, destined 
to Denver or points beyond, or originating at Denver destined to Kansas City. On 
reconsideration, majority eliminated this condition on the ground that opposing carriers 
do not need this protection. P.I.E. was one of the protestants. Bruce Motor Freight, 
Inc.-Purchase-Pittsley, 65 M.C.C. 563 (1955) (purchase approved subject to concurrent 
cancellation of some of the acquired rights and condition barring vendee from utilizing 
rights for transportation between Chicago, Twin Cities and St. Louis); Trans-American 
Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Allen Motor Lines, 65 M.C.C. 163 (1955), reversing 
59 M.C.C. 695 (1953) (purchase approved with restrictions as to territory in spite of 
absence of prior interlining between applicants, shippers complain about delays and 
loss due to interchange and protestants, ·"substantial and well established carriers," 
should be stimulated by increased competition to render improved service); Baggett 
Transportation Co.-Purchase-Hunt Freight Lines, 70 M.C.C. 169 (1956) (purchase ap-
proved with restrictions to protect competitors handling satisfactorily all available 
traffic between Chattanooga and Atlanta, detailed discussion of precedents to the effect 
that restrictions on operating rights in §5 cases "tend to create problems of interpretation 
and operating complications" and should not be imposed "unless clearly justified"). See 
also Moland-Purchase-Saunders and Welty, 39 M.C.C. 321 at 326 (1943), reversing 38 
M.C.C. 625 (1942), on the basis of new evidence as to competitive conditions in the area. 
In Clyde-Control; Service, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Yeary Transfer Co., 59 M.C.C. 
517 at 527 (1953), a purchase of interstate rights of a connecting carrier which had inter-
lined substantial traffic with vendee approved against the objection that the transaction 
would result in separation of vendor's interstate and intrastate rights. The Commission's 
jurisdiction under §5 to entertain applications by interstate carriers for authority to 
purchase properties of a carrier operating physically within one state but whose activities 
involve transportation in interstate commerce between places within such state under 
an intrastate certificate was sustained in Baggett Transportation Co. v. United States, 
(N.D. Ala. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 167. 
148Atchison, Topeka &: Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1955) 130 F. 
Supp. 76 at 79, affd. per curiam 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rehearing den. 350 U.S. 943 (1956). 
The court observed (at p. 78) that there were no allegations of present or threatened 
financial injury. Alton Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942), was distinguished 
on the ground that it involved a Commission order granting new operating rights. 
1958] MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS 1273 
obvious. A good illustration is St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.-Pur-
chase-Hinsch Transportation Co.149 That transaction involved 
common carrier operations in New England, New York and north-
ern New Jersey. Vendor, who sought to sell because of poor health 
and recurring deficits, operated between the New York-New Jersey 
area and Boston, where it interchanged most of its traffic with 
one of the protestants and only "occasionally ... some shipments 
with vendee."150 Much of its tonnage was transported in semitrail-
ers loaded on railroad flatcars. Vendee's operations were conducted 
principally north of Boston and Springfield, where it inter-
changed with other carriers. This has not been satisfactory with 
respect to less than truckloads, and approval of the purchase would 
enable vendee to institute through-service from northern New 
England to New Jersey. Moreover, vendor's preponderant north-
bound traffic could be balanced with vendee's predominant south-
bound shipments.151 Representatives of nine shippers with plants 
in Maine, Vermont and New Jersey supported the application.152 
Numerous competing motor carriers appeared in opposition, 
submitting operating statistics as to revenues and expenses. Divi-
sion 4 devoted ten printed pages of its report to a summary of these 
data.153 Only two of the protestants admitted that they had no 
reason to fear losses.154 One other showed that since the grant of 
temporary authority to vendee155 it had "lost 80 percent of the 
traffic moving to and from vendee's northern New England area 
to points in the area served under vendor's rights .... A maximum 
of 20 percent of its equipment is now idle."156 Most of the opposing 
carriers had high operating ratios, and many could handle more 
traffic. All claimed that an entirely new service would be estab-
lished. Accordingly, a majority of Division 4 denied the application 
on the ground that "intense competition" exists in the area, "car-
riers have expended their energy and resources in developing 
149 59 M.C.C. 419 (1953) (approval denied in 2-1 decision); reversed and approved, 
subject to conditions 59 M.C.C. 747 (1954), modified 60 M.C.C. 129 (1954), complaint 
dismissed M. &: M. Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 
296, affd. per curiam 350 U.S. 857 (1955). 
150 59 M.C.C. 419 at 427 (1953). 
151 Id. at 428-429. 
152 Id. at 431-434. 
153 Id. at 434-444. 
154 Id. at 435 and 437. 
155 See Stone's Express Co. v. United States, (D.C. -Mass. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 955. 
156 59 M.C.C. 419 at 440-441 (1953). The figures quoted in the text pertained to 
M. &: M. Transportation Co., which later sued to set aside the approval, note 149 supra. 
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facilities to handle all available traffic, and . . . they are rendering 
an adequate service," and "are entitled to protection against . 
• "157 a new service. . . . 
On reconsideration, the full Commission said that "most of 
the carriers had increased their operating revenues and net in-
come in 1948, and it does not appear that they have or would 
lose sufficient traffic as a result of the transaction to affect mate-
rially their operations. . . . [T]he traffic in the territory is ample 
to support continuation of a part of vendor's operations as unified 
with those of vendee, as well as the operations of competing car-
riers."158 Accordingly, the application was approved on the con-
dition that all operating rights not used by vendor should be 
cancelled.159 The subsequent complaint of the protestant carrier 
most affected by the transaction was dismissed on the usual ground 
that there was substantial, though conflicting evidence to support 
the Commission's findings, and strict consistency with its prior 
decisions was not required of the Commission.160 
The reversal of the initial report of Division 4 was not based 
on new evidence. Hence, the bare statement of diametrically op-
posite conclusions drawn from the same record by the full Com-
mission is regrettable because of its failure to explain "why the 
change of attitude came about"161 after the delay and expense of 
protracted hearings and rehearings. That change involved the key 
question of the Commission's economic regulation: "How does 
it determine the limits of permissible competition?"162 To be sure, 
a reasoned answer is not necessary where the evidence seems con-
clusive that protestants would be destroyed or that their ability 
to continue as common carriers would not be affected, as in the 
Baltimore Transfer Co. case discussed above.163 But in St. Johns-
1111 Id. at 445-446. 
158 59 M.C.C. 747 at 758-759 (1954). 
159 Id. at 759, 761, 762. The condition was later made more strict by requiring can-
cellation of all of vendor's operating rights except those which "would permit an opera-
tion between vendee's existing rights in northern New England, on the one hand, and 
on the other, points in the involved New York-New Jersey area.'' 60 M.C.C. 129 at 130 
(1954). Thus, the Commission met the protestants half-way. See Adams Report, note 58 
supra, pp. 294-296. 
160 M. & M. Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 296 
at 301, and cases cited. Accord, Anderson Motor Service v. United States, (E.D. Mo. 1957) 
151 F. Supp. 577 at 581. 
161 Adams Report, note 58 supra, p. 356. The criticism quoted in the text referred 
to another decision, but is repeated throughout the report. 
162 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
163See text at note 143 supra. The evidence in the McLean Trucking case was also 
clear on this point. 
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bury Trucking Go. reasqnable men differed about the evaluation 
of the evidence as indicated by the different results reached by 
Division 4 and the full Commission. The Federal Motor Carrier 
Act was intended to prevent "over-competition" leading to de-
pressed rates, or deterioration and ultimate disappearance of serv-
ices, but not intense or "constructive" competition.164 Hence, the 
ultimate rejection of the protests of St. Johnsbury's competitors 
presented an opportunity to elucidate the Commission's approach 
in close cases as to how it defines both concepts, what criteria, if 
any, it uses to distinguish the latter from the former and what 
evidence protestants must present in order to convince the Com-
mission that an oversupply of motor-carrier service is threatened. 
The Commission has been criticized for its failure to develop a 
clear, practical and consistent philosophy with respect to these 
difficult questions; 165 its interpretation of section 5 in general terms, 
as approved in the McLean Trucking Go. case, certainly does not 
help solving specific, complicated and ambiguous situations. 
On the other hand, it should be remembered that both the 
164 Statement of Commissioner A. F. Arpaia, Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, 
p. 166. Commissioner Owen Clarke, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on 
Small Business (Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 101 
(1957), said: "If it [competition] results in more economical and better service to the 
public by increasing competition, then we are for it. If increasing competition adversely 
affects the quality of service and the price of the service, then, in following out the 
national transportation policy, we are opposed ·to increased competition in those in-
stances ••• there are two kinds of competition: Constructive competition and destructive 
competition. The national transportation policy explicitly states we should prohibit or 
prevent what might be called destructive competition." 
165 Adams Report, note 58 supra, passim. Testimony of Dr. Adams in S. Hearings 
Before Select Committee on Small Business (Trucking ,Mergers and Concentrations) 85th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 133 (1957). Law and Ingham Trans. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Wood-
berry, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,278 (1955), is an example of inconsistency as pointed 
out in the Adams Report, pp. 270-275, 284, 285. On facts similar to St. Johnsbury, ap-
plication of a small carrier was denied; applicants urged that protestants had failed to 
show their volume of traffic or their shippers which might be subject to competition by 
vendees, nor any actual losses during temporarily authorized operations by vendee. 
Division 4 was satisfied by the fact that protestants' operating ratios had become less 
favorable. Compare Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-Carleton [authority 
for vendee (operating in 30 states) to purchase small trucker owning 5 pieces of equip-
ment denied three times on the ground that reactivation of sporadically exercised rights 
would result in new service] 58 M.C.C. 814 (1952), 60 M.C.C. 415 (1954), 65 M.C.C. 331 
(1955), reversed and granted, 4 Commissioners dissenting, 65 M.C.C. 781 (1956) (mere 
apprehensions of competing carriers no ground for denial in absence of proof that 
additional competition would seriously impair their services; competition among house-
hold goods carriers different from other industries since individual shippers may make 
long-distance move only once or twice in a life-time; vendor's sporadic operations were 
consistent with his resources). See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 350-356, for a detailed 
account of this case. 
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total ton-miles of regulated carriers of property and the truckers' 
percentage of that total increased spectacularly in recent years.166 
At the same time, full or partial approvals of section 5 applica-
tions outnumbered denials by 3 to 1.167 Hence, the Commission 
may be correct in claiming that "many of these mergers have 
added to the efficiency of the trucking industry"168 and, in fact, 
brought about "increased competition" by mak~ng "a single com-
pany which has greater stability and dependability from a financial 
standpoint better able to compete with the thousands of other 
motor carriers and railroads."169 However, this does not dispense 
with the desirability of furnishing clearer directional lines as to 
where the line should be drawn between excessive and reasonable 
competition. 
V. ACQUISITION OF DORMANT OPERATING RIGHTS 
The question whether to protect competitors against destruc-
tive competition or expose them to constructive competition has 
been particularly troublesome in the determination of applica-
tions for authority to acquire control or purchase operating rights 
of a vendor who has not exercised all or some of his rights or has 
rendered sporadic services only for some time.170 It is settled that 
cessation of operations does not necessarily or automatically cause 
a revocation or lapse of an operating authority previously granted 
166!.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 45 (Nov. 1, 1956): "The increase of 18.1% in ton miles 
from 1949 to 1955 for the railroads ... compares with increases of 56.8% for regulated 
motor carriers .... " The railroads' ton miles increased 86.3% from 1939-1955, but their 
share of the total declined from 62.4% to 49%. Motor vehicle tonnage during the same 
period increased 328%, and ... share of the total rose from 9.7 to 17.7%. Id., p. 43. 
Total intercity ton-miles (all modes of transportation) were as follows: 543.5 billion 
(1939), 915.8 billion (1949), 1,277.8 billion (1955), id., p. 44. It is estimated that in 1957 
intercity trucks hauled 260 billion ton-miles of freight, 6 billion more than in 1956. N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 97:1: "Trucks capture 19% of freight." Comparison of 1955 with 
1956 shows percentages of total <ton-miles: railroads decreased from 49.41 to 48.22; motor 
carriers increased from 17.7 to 18.66. I.C.C. 71st ANN. REP. 10 (1957). 
16'1' From the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act through 1955 the Commission 
granted 4,510 and denied 1,216 applications. Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, 
p. 329. During the period Nov. 1, 1955 to Oct. 31, 1956, 271 applications were granted 
and 50 denied. I.C.C. 70th ANN. REP. 78 (1956). 
168 Commissioner Mitchell in S. Hearings, note 165 supra, p. 103. 
169 Commissioner Clarke, id. at 102. 
170 Some of the rights of vendor in the St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. case were 
dormant; text to note 159 supra; rights are not considered as "dormant" when operations 
thereunder were on a scale commensurate with the carrier's facilities. See Watson 
Brothers Transp. Co.-Purchase (Portion)-Powell Brothers Truck Lines, 57 M.C.C. 
661 (1951). 
1958] MOTOR CARRIER MERGERS 1277 
by the Commission.171 Consequently, the holder of dormant rights 
may either himself resume their exercise or sell them. If he does 
the latter, the problems discussed above with reference to ac-
quisition of active rights take on added complexity because other 
carriers are likely to claim that they have filled the void which 
occurred when vendor ceased operations by expansion of their 
own facilities. Substantiation of such a claim may have the double-
barrelled effect of showing that shippers do not need such a pur-
chase and that competitors could not long survive its consumma-
tion; opposing carriers might even invoke the P.l.E.-Keeshin doc-
trine that vendee is seeking the institution of a new service. 
The Commission has denied many applications for the pur-
chase of dormant rights. A significant illustration is Herrin Trans-
portation Co. v. United States.172 Herrin sought authority to pur-
chase the operating rights of vendor which had conducted no 
operations for over a year. The transaction was intended to enable 
Herrin to institute a single-line service; twenty shippers and con-
signees and three of Herrin's connecting carriers supported it. 
Other shippers supported the protestants. Two successive Hearing 
Examiners recommended denial because "to permit vendee to 
institute the service authorized by vendor's certificate in this 
highly competitive area [between New Orleans and Mobile] would 
have the effect of imposing a penalty on intervenors ... at a time 
when available traffic is diminishing." In addition, "the revenue 
which the intervenors derive from handling interline shipments 
is essential to their operations. The diversion of a substantial 
amount of this traffic to vendee would no doubt impair their 
ability to continue their present service. The evidence adduced 
171 General Transportation Co. v. United States, (D.C. Mass. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 981, 
affd. per curiam 329 U.S. 668 (1946) [approval of purchase of dormant rights sustained: 
revocation can be effectuated only in accordance with the procedure set forth in §212(a), 
49 U.S.C. (1952) §!ll2(a) of the act; plaintiff's argument that vendor had ceased to be a 
common carrier since it no longer held itself out to the general public (49 U.S.C. (1952) 
§303(a)(l4) rejected]. Accord: Quaker City Bus. Co.-Purchase-Blackhawk Line, 38 M.C.C. 
603 at 606 (1942); Powell Bros. Truck Lines, Inc.-Purchase-John B. Bryan, 39 M.C.C. 
11 at 17 (1943): "Regular-route common carriers •.• are not called upon to transport 
traffic between each and every combination of points which they are authorized to serve, 
and •to require a continuity of operation in this respect would destroy a carrier's flexibil• 
ity of service contrary to the declaration of policy in the act. . . • The mere nonuser 
by Bryan of his right to operate between St. Louis and Kansas City did not extinguish 
his right to do so." Complaint dismissed in Byers Transport. Co. v. United States, r,N .D. 
Mo. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 828. 
172 (E.D. La. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 89, affd. per curiam 344 U.S. 925 (1953). 
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by shippers indicates a preference for the proposed through 
service more than it shows a real need .... "173 
Division 4 granted approval on the ground of need and lack 
of a showing that existing carriers would be "materially" affected, 
but the full Commission agreed with the examiners and reversed.174 
The court refused to interfere, observing that there was a rational 
basis for the denial and the weighing of conflicting evidence was 
the job of the Commission.175 Again, the Commission had not 
elaborated its reasons for resolving the conflict one way rather 
than the other, although its reversal of the prior report on the 
same record should have been explained by such elaboration. 
Yet, the relatively large size of the vendee and the finding by the 
examiners as to the disastrous effect of the proposal on competing 
carriers rendering satisfactory service plausibly support this and 
similar denials.176 Hence, it would appear that acquisition of 
dormant rights is governed by the same principles as acquisition 
of active rights. However, other applications, including some by 
small vendees, relating to dormant or little used rights have also 
been denied on the ground that no need had been shown for what 
would be, in effect, a new service in spite of the fact that in some 
cases vendee had considerable shipper support. These reports do 
not even refer to specific evidence as to the repercussions, if any, 
such a purchase would have on competitors.177 
173 108 F. Supp. at 92. 
174 Herrin Transportation Co.-Purchase-Mobile Express, 57 M.C.C. 523 at 532 
(1951), revd. 58 M.C.C. 59 (1951). 
175 108 F. Supp. at 94-95. 
176 McLean Trucking Co.-Purchase-D. J. Black, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf33,731 (1956); 
Pacific Intermountain Express-Purchase-Browning Freight Lines, 58 M.C.C. 629 at 
638 (1952); Shein's Express-Purchase (Portion)-Central Jersey Motor Lines, 59 M.C.C. 
534 at 548-549 (1953) (vendor's operations not active or continuous, no record of inter-
lining between parties, serious threat to existing carriers, no evidence of shipper support). 
See also L. Nelson 8: Sons Transport. Co.-Purchase-White's Express 8: Transfer Co., 
59 M.C.C. 675 at 679 (1953); American Red Ball Transit Co.-Purchase-B 8: H Transfer 
&: Storage Co., 9 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf32,408 (1952). 
177 Interstate Motor Freight System-Purchase-Wesson Co., 55 M.C.C. 222 (1948); 
A. A. O'Connor-Purchase--McCullough Trucking Co., 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf33,708 
(1956) (Comr. Mitchell dissented on the ground that protestants had made no case against 
this "sale of rights by a small business man"). Loo-Mac Freight Lines-Purchase (Portion)-
Gordons Transports, 55 M.C.C. 196 at 201 (1948) (refers only -to "possible adverse effect" 
of resumption of operations by new carrier on existing carriers); Kenosha Auto Transport 
Corp.-Purchase-Frey and Witt, 55 M.C.C. 76 (1948) (vendor never conducted any business, 
purchase of "bare" certificate disallowed); Transcon Lines-Purchase (Portion)-Anderson 
Motor Service Co., 56 M.C.C. 521 at 534, 549, 555 (1950) (much shipper support, but 
protestants are large and efficient operators, traffic in area is decreasing, new service not 
justifiable). Accord: Liberty Motor Freight Lines-Purchase-Tumbleson, 59 M.C.C. 581 
(1953); Groendyke Transport-Purchase-Foree Trans. Co., 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. lf32,841 
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The total picture is~ thus, confused on several accounts: If 
vendee is a small carrier, or if protestants are larger than the ap-
plicants, serious threats to the competitive survival of existing 
carriers do not seem likely. Moreover, some reports imply that 
serious consequences need not be shown, and that the applicants 
have the burden of proof as to the public interest. Indeed, in Rat-
ner-Control-Tompkins Motor Lines178 an individual who con-
trolled three motor carriers sought to acquire control of a vendor 
whose rights had not been exercised to any appreciable extent 
with respect to certain specified commodities. In denying the ap• 
plication, two members of Division 4 said: 
"Most protestants have indicated the volume of their traf-
fic in the considered territory, and although they have not de-
tailed specifically the traffic which they believe would be lost 
to such proposed operations, their evidence is sufficient to 
show that they would be adversely affected thereby. The bur-
den of showing that ·the proposed coordinated operations 
would meet a public need and would be consistent with the 
public interest is upon applicant. In the instant proceeding, 
that showing has not been made." 
A divided three-judge court affirmed, saying that "the use of these 
words ... are unfortunate and do not correctly state the law," but 
"a mere play of words" should not destroy the finding that the 
proposed acquisition 
" ... would create a new service in an area already adequately 
served by motor carriers, and that such new service could 
draw additional traffic only from existing carriers to the detri-
ment of said existing carriers .... The term 'public interest' 
as used in Section 5 clearly embraces the interest of compet-
ing carriers. Their interest and that of the general public is 
the same in preventing uneconomic transportation. The entry 
of plaintiff into the area would disrupt the competitive bal-
(1953). Eclipse Motor Lines, Inc.-Purchase-McMaster Bros. Transfer, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 
609 at 614 (1953) (railroad opposition successful because of "complete absence of any 
evidence showing a need for the reinstitution of service"); Willers, Inc.-Purchase (Por-
tion)-Everson, 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff32,973 (1953) (burden of proof not met by 
applicants); Atkinson & Sons-Purchase-Kellman, 11 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,705 (1956). 
See also Von Der Ahe Van Lines-Purchase-Swornstedt Storage & Van Co., 60 M.C.C. 593 
at 608, 610 (1954) (acquisition to enable vendee to add six new states to its radial rights 
where its connecting carriers are too slow. All large Van Lines opposed; "possible adverse 
effect" on them by this new service held to outweigh public benefits). See critical comment 
in Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 374, 375. As to denials of applications for purchase 
of dormant rights see Adams Report, pp. 281-286 (small carriers) and 300-303 (large 
carriers). 
178 70 M.C.C. 251, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,799 (1956). 
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ance with harmful effect on the competing earners without 
compensatory benefits to the public .... "179 
It would seem, then, that "the law" as distinguished from some 
carelessly written reports requires a showing of inevitable damage 
to opposing carriers.180 But, as noted above, many denials do not 
elaborate how much of such damage, if any, must be shovm to 
prevent approval of a purchase intended to revitalize dormant or 
little used rights. On the other hand, in numerous other cases 
approval was granted because the Commission concluded, some-
times on reconsideration, that there was a reasonable continuity 
of service and competitors would be able to continue unimpaired 
services even at the risk of some losses.181 These decisions imply 
that only pretty convincing evidence of oversupply of transporta-
119 Ratner v. United States, (S.D. Ill. 1957) 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[81,164, affd. per 
curiam 356 U.S. 368 (1958). 
180 Denver•Chicago Trucking Co. v. United States, (D.C. Colo. 1953) 9 CCH Fed. Car. 
Cas. 1[80,846 (protestant's failure to appear at ·hearing deemed waiver of objection to 
purchase application). 
181 Shapiro-Purchase-Kasen, 56 M.C.C. 755 at 763 (1950) (small vendee wishing to 
buy out a carrier which has not been an active competitor of protestants. "Some of the 
truckload traffic which might be lost by them to vendees was available to them only 
because of the inavailability of needed satisfactory less-than-truckload service"). Adlay 
Express Co.-Purchase-Savage Truck Line, 65 M.C.C. 457 (1955) (acquisition by larger 
carrier approved on condition that dormant parts of vendor's authority be cancelled; 
expanding traffic in .territory thought to enable protestants to make adjustments). (Adams 
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 296, 297); Holland Transportation Co.-Purchase-Th. Apicella, 
56 M.C.C. 157 (1949) (vendor had leased its rights ·to lessee which became insolvent, re-
ceiver conducted no operations, no proof submitted by protestants that their functions 
as common carriers would be impaired). Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-
Carleton, 60 M.C.C. 415 (1954), denial affd. 65 M.C.C. 331 (1955), revd. 65 M.C.C. 781 
(1956) (four dissents). See note 165 supra. Howard Van Lines, Inc.-Purchase (Portion)-
McHugo Transfer Co., 60 .M.C.C. 57 (1954) (vendee, large household goods carrier in 29 
states, wished to buy some operating rights of Washington carrier to avoid circuitous 
transportation to Pacific Northwest. Eleven motor-carriers of household goods, including 
the nation-wide systems, opposed, pleading that they would lose tonnage). See Adams 
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 362-363. Shipper witnesses supported the application. Id., 
pp. 359-362. Division 4 denied approval because vendors, prior to agreement, had per-
formed limited operations only, new service would be established and competitors are 
entitled to protection. Reversed, 12 COH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,874 (1957) (vendors' operations 
increased subsequent to purchase agreement). Watkins Motor Lines-Purchase-Peninsula 
Corp., 10 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[32,980 (1953), reversing 58 M.C.C. 355 (1952) (opera-
tions by vendor had been limited prior to vendee's exercise of temporary authority, 
and supporting shippers appeared at rehearing. Purchase of operating rights as to 
canned goods approved in absence of showing of "serious" effect on competitors. Vendors 
unused rights to transport numerous other commodities cancelled). For other cases of 
approval conditioned on cancellation of a part of vendor's operating rights see Roy 
Brothers Transport. Co.-Purchase-Maliar, 65 M.C.C. 339 (1955), and DeVenne-Control-
Allman Transfer &: Moving Co., 65 M.C.C. 211 (1955), 65 M.C.C. 661 (1956). Adams 
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 281, 299, 300. Mid-Continent Freight Lines-Purchase-Hanson 
Motor Express, Inc., 65 ,M.C.C. 312 (1955), and Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 297-299 
(cessation of operation for 11 months does not create dormancy, but rights not exercised 
for several years shall be cancelled. Protestants must show "with some particularity" 
that they cannot adjust to additional competition). Clifford Skipworth-Purchase-
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tion threatening maintenance of service and survival of compet-
itors as a group should be recognized as justification for denial. 
VI. HORIZONTAL MERGERS 
The trucking mergers, consolidations, acquisitions of stock 
or assets or purchases of operating rights discussed above involved 
transactions between connecting carriers. "Horizontal" unifica-
tions of carriers operating in the same general territory182 seem to 
be less frequent by comparison. They do not offer the advantages 
of replacing interlining with single-line through service and com-
plementing existing route patterns. Moreover, horizontal unifica-
tions would remove competition between vendor and vendee and 
might thereby undermine the competitive strength of other carriers 
serving the same area. 
The Commission has shown awareness of these problems. For 
instance, in 1946 it authorized Converse Trucking Service, a com-
mon carrier of heavy machinery in the Pacific Northwest, to lease 
for five years the operating rights of Mitchell as to transportation 
of general commodities. Mitchell had been running only one or 
two vehicles a day between Portland and San Francisco, and 
wished to confine his activities to intrastate operations in Oregon. 
Converse believed that due to its greater resources it would con-
duct interstate operations over the same route more profitably 
than Mitchell, particularly because the lease would enable Con-
verse to transport a wider range of commodities. The Commission 
approved, finding that lessee would provide a better service than 
lessor and protesting competitors would not be seriously affected.183 
Prior to expiration of this lease, Converse and Mitchell filed 
application under section 5 seeking approval for the purchase of 
Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 39 M.C.C. 741 (1944) (protestants' reference to dis-
continuance of vendor's operations and their ability to handle all available business 
disregarded). Commissioner Miller dissented, citing Gregg Cartage &: Storage Co. v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 74 at 83 (1942): " ..• any substantial interruption of one carrier's service 
tends to result in expansion of other facilities to meet the continuing needs of shippers 
and thus to cause overcrowding if the suspended service is resumed." In that case a 
grandfather application was denied because applicant's services were interrupted during 
the statutory period. Superior Trucking Co.-Purchase-Moore, 13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 
1[34,284 (1958) (sporadic nature of vendor's operations, due to specialized nature of its au-
thority, no bar to approval). Accord, Dennis Trucking Co.-Control-Johnson Tranfer, 
13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[34,295 (1958), modifying 70 M.C.C. 741 (no evidence offered by 
protestants). 
182 Definition by Dr. Adams, S. Hearings Before Select Committee on Small Business 
(Trucking Mergers and Concentrations), 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 204 (1957). Dr. Adams 
cited as an example an acquisition by a railroad-controlled truck line. See Adams Report, 
note 58 supra, pp. 306-308 as to the special problems of such transactions. 
183 Converse-Lease-Mitchell, 40 M.C.C. 452 (1946). 
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the leased rights. At the same time, four interstate truckers 
operating over the same routes sought to purchase the Mitchell 
rights from Converse, together with the physical property of Con-
verse used in the leased operations. Converse indicated that its 
operations under the lease had been unprofitable and it needed 
the proceeds from the proposed sale to the four truckers to pay 
pressing obligations and secure working capital for its heavy-
hauling operations which it planned to retain. Although these 
applications were supported by four shippers, the Commission, 
nevertheless, denied, because the .case presented "the novel situa-
tion of four of the largest competing motor carriers operating 
between Portland and San Francisco conceiving a plan, and join-
ing together in its execution, for the elimination of the actual 
competition which they have experienced in the past from service 
rendered under Mitchell's operating rights; and, perhaps, of 
greater importance from their standpoint, the potential competi-
tion which might be supplied in the future should the operating 
rights come into the hands of a new and more aggressive operator . 
. . . The plan is obviously one to restrain competition through con-
c;:erted action of the vendees as a group."184 
Subsequently, Converse improved operating results by closing 
its rented terminal in Portland and by other economies. It then ap-
plied again for permission to buy the Mitchell rights, and, this 
time, the four truckers who had participated in the previous pro-
ceeding as proposed buyers opposed the application. They con-
ceded that Converse "has not been and is not now a serious com-
petitive factor in the territory covered by the leased rights," but 
voiced grave concern lest "vendee might sell the rights to a new and 
more aggressive operator, in which event they would stand to lose 
traffic and revenue which they cannot afford to do." The Commis-
sion, rejecting their protest, pointed out that if the new application 
were to be denied, the leased rights would revert to Mitchell who 
would offer the same competition to protestants.185 An even 
stronger reason, although not articulated in the report, was that 
the protests against the purchase of the leased rights had no merit 
because protestants' fears as to the future were mere speculation 
and any future acquisition of the rights by some powerful new 
buyer would anyway have to be approved by the Commission. 
The denial of the first and approval of the second Converse pur-
184 Converse-Purchase-Mitchell, 56 M.C.C. 299 at 307-308 (1950). 
185 Converse-Purchase-Mitchell, 57 M.C.C. 551 at 558-559 (1951). 
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chase application would seem to imply that horizontal unification 
proposals will be scrutinized as to their effect on competition. But 
it is hard to generalize from the first Converse denial where disap-
pearance of all competition was the aim of the parties. By contrast, 
Dalby Motor Freight Lines, Inc.186 involved a horizontal acquisi-
tion motivated by reasonable business purposes. Dalby wished 
to acquire Webb's operating rights between Denver and Amarillo, 
Texas, which duplicated Dalby's authorized operations except 
that Dalby had no intrastate rights and no authority to serve cer-
tain off-route points named in Webb's certificate. Webb was on 
the brink of receivership, and wished to retire from the business; 
Dalby's operations over the considered route were also unprofit-
able. Approval would enable Dalby to offer a better balanced and 
more complete service and bring about considerable economies 
by eliminating duplication of expenses. In granting approval, 
the Commission said: 
"Applicant would be the only motor carrier of property op-
erating over the entire route, but there are other such carriers 
operating over segments of the same route, and a rail carrier 
affords service to all principal points. The record does not 
indicate that continuance of separate competitive operations 
by applicant and vendor is warranted by the available traf-
fic."181 
This decision is in accord with the basic legislative intention 
of preventing oversupply of transportation. Hence, under the 
McLean Trucking Co. doctrine it correctly applies section 5 in 
spite of the fact that competition between the parties was termin-
ated. But even under section 7 of the Clayton Act this acquisition 
may have been lawful if the Commission's above-quoted language 
meant that Webb was in such straits as to preclude the probability 
of his being able to continue in business.188 The transaction was 
unopposed and there was no other buyer of Webb. 
The problem of horizontal unifications has, apparently, most 
frequently been raised in cases involving common control of 
duplicate operations. Thus, in Florman-Control-Automobile 
Convoy Co.189 the Commission denied an application for pur-
chase of the stock of a carrier engaged in operations duplicating 
186 Dalby Motor Freight Lines, Inc.-Purchase-Webb, 85 M.C.C. 619 (1940). 
187 Id. at 622. 
188 See Justice Stone's dissent in International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280 U.S. 291 at 806 
(1980). 
189 85 M.C.C. 521 (1940). 
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those of applicant over a considerable territory. Vendee's princi-
pal stockholder desired to sell to his brother a portion of vendor's 
stock; hence, he intended to maintain the separate corporate 
entities of vendee and vendor rather than effectuate a merger of 
the two corporations~ Under common control they would "use 
common terminals, repair, maintenance, ... accounting facilities, 
and operating personnel, which would result in a material re-
duction in the operating expenses of each." Ignoring these ad-
vantages, the Commission held that creation of multiple corpora- , 
tions rendering similar or identical services was uneconomical 
and incompatible with the policy of encouraging corporate sim-
plification. Moreover, 
"Common control of separate entities authorized to engage in 
substantially duplicate operations affords opportunity for un-
fair competition and for unjust discriminations and pref-
erences between shippers and consignees as to rates and prac-
tices .... Applicant contends that the application should be 
approved unless we find that preferences or discriminations 
will actually result. . . . Our consideration is not so limited 
and necessarily includes weighing the possible effect of the 
transaction upon the industry and the general public."190 
This rule has been followed in other cases, sometimes accompanied 
by the suggestion that the parties might consider merger.191 In 
190 Id. at 524. 
191 Franko-Control-White Star Trucking Co., 36 M.C.C. 527 (1941) (no opposition, 
but denied on the authority of Florman "without prejudice to the submission by the 
parties of a revised plan under which the properties of Franko Brothers and White Star 
would be unified through purchase, merger, or consolidation''); accord: Conklin Truck 
Line, Inc.-Purchase-Bushroe, 37 M.C.C. 467 at 472 (1941) (argument that unification 
not practical because of possible loss of intrastate certificates brushed aside); H & K 
Motor Transportation, Inc.-Control-C. & L. E. Truck Co., 36 M.C.C. 23 at 28 (1940) 
(denial and suggestion to merge); Textile Transportation, Inc.-Purchase-Textile Trans• 
portation Corp., 38 M.C.C. 256 (1942) (extension of common control over operations 
which would be competitive except for the fact of common control denied); Western 
Motor Freight, Inc.-Purchase-Helphrey and Luft, 37 M.C.C. 692 (1941) (same); Suwak-
Control-Trolley Transfer Service, Inc., 39 M.C.C. 753 (1944) (same); Eick-Control-Alma 
Lines, Inc., 38 M.C.C. 15 (1941) (same); Marion Trucking Co.-Investigation of Control-
E. E. Mills Trucking Co., 59 M.C.C. 567 at 575 (1953) (same, order to terminate control 
unla:wfully acquired and exercised); Associated Transport-Control and Consol.-Arrow 
Carrier Corp., 36 M.C.C. 61 at 86-87 (1940) (large horizontal merger disapproved for fail. 
ure to present satisfactory plan to accomplish "singleness of title''); Darling-Control-
Brumm Transit, II CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,310 (1955); Chippewa Motor Freight-Control-
Metza, 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1[33,999 (1957). See also Great Lake and Texas Motor Trans-
port-Lease-Crawford, 39 -M.C.C. 493 at 498 (1943), and Elliott Bros. Trucking Co. v. 
United States, (D.C. Md. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 328 at 334. Compare Ballard & Skellet Van 
Lines-Consol., 58 M.C.C. 539 at 551-552 (1952). Van Company was formed by Ballard 
and Skellet companies whose rights were duplicating. All three would be managed 
in a common interest: Van would take over interstate operations, buy the rights and 
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some few instances the Commission insisted that a merger be ac-
complished concurrently with or in a short period after stock 
acquisition. There was no evidence of adverse effects on com-
petition in the territory.192 When there is such evidence, the appli-
cation will be denied on general grounds.1922 
Significantly, the prohibition against common control of du-
plicating operations has not been applied when substantial dif-
ferences in the nature of the operations of vendor and vendee com-
pelled the conclusion that the parties were not competing with 
each other.193 Approval was also granted where vendor's discon-
tinuance was imminent due to distressed finances and illness and 
old age of its officers, 194 or when -it was feasible to eliminate par-
tial duplications of the services involved.195 
properties of Ballard and Skellet and sell some of the latter to Watson. Van would 
serve the same territory embraced in the rights of Skellet and Ballard and "permit 
Watson to render a duplicate independent service in the same territory." Denied with 
the suggestion that Ballard and Skellet "should be unified in a single operation, with 
duplications eliminated, and without the creation of an additional competitive operation." 
Although the report, regrettably, does not state that the additional competition would 
threaten the protesting carriers, this may have been implied and would justify the 
result. The principal .basis for the denial seems to have been the pyramiding of an 
additional corporation upon the existing ones. The criticism of the decision in Adams' 
Report, note 58 supra, pp. 366-371, overlooks that point. 
192 Munroe and Arnold-Merritt Express, Inc.-Control-Beacon Fast Freight Co., 57 
M.C.C. 539 at 547 (1951) (application for common control with promise that merger 
would follow within 15 months denied, merger should be concurrent); Steffke Freight Co.-
Purchase-Albrent Freight and Storage Corp., 70 M.C.C. 321 (1957); Fitterling Transport 
Co.-Control-Shippers Dispatch, 39 M.C.C. 595 at 600 (1944) (merger to take place 
within 90 days after purchase of stock; twenty motor carriers were competing with ap-
plicants). Signal Harbor Service, Inc.-Purchase-Stordor .Express, 38 M.C.C. 247 at 248 
(1942). Standard Freight Lines-Merger-Bates -Motor Transport, 40 M.C.C. 41 (1945), 
approved a merger of two companies operating out of the same terminal with some 
duplications in operating rights which would be eliminated. 
192a Heavy Haulers, Inc.-Purchase (Portion) Billy Baker Co., 13 CCH Fed. Car Cas. 
ff34,246 (1958), reversing 70 M.C.C. 365. 
198 Hayes-Control-Terminal Transfer, CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff30,581 (1943) (vendee 
in long-haul traffic, vendor in local cartage operations; general manager of vendor to be 
given "added incentive" by participation in stock ownership; perhaps this was a "con-
glomerate" merger). See also Ryder System, Inc.-Control-Miller Motor Linc of N.C., 
12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. ff33,800 (1956) (acquisition and maintenance under common 
control by Ryder of two trucking firms approved: intention of creating vast system 
irrelevant for present case, operations of vendors different from those of prosperous and 
growing protestant), petition for reconsideration pending. The expansion program of 
the Ryder System is discussed in I.C.C. 71st ANN. REP. 55 (1957). 
194 Ramos-Control-Overland Transfer Co., 35 M.C.C. 9 (1939). Dalby Motor Freight 
Lines, notes 186-188 supra. 
195 Standard Freight Lines, Inc.-Merger-Bates -Motor Transport, 40 M.C.C. 41 
(1945); Lebovitz-Control-Connecticut -Motor Lines, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 104 at 108 (1953), 
reversing 58 M.C.C. 487 (1952) (approved on condition that operating authority of vendee 
be modified to preclude transportation of any ·traffic between Philadelphia and New 
York, when such traffic originates at and is destined to those points); Davidson-Purchase-
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With respect to the related problem of interlocking individual 
interests the Commission adopted similar policies. Noteworthy, 
in this respect, is W. W. Brown-Purchase-W. W. Brown.196 
Brown and his four partners sought to buy the rights and proper-
ty o~ Saginaw Transfer Co. of Saginaw, Michigan. The partner-
ship was not a carrier, but each of the partners owned stock in-
terests, some controlling ones, in other carriers. Brmvn himself 
had purchased the Saginaw Transfer Co. which the partnership 
wished to have transferred to it for operation by a corporation to 
be organized. The routes of all the carriers involved coincided 
at many points. Citing the Florman case, the Commission denied, 
adding that " ... the practice of creating i:r;iterlocking interests in 
various carriers . . . should be discouraged. Such practice is con-
trary to the Commission's policy of encouraging corporate sim-
plification, creates conflicting interests and divided responsibility, 
makes it difficult to ascertain where control actually lies in par-
ticular instances, and is not conducive to maintenance of healthy 
competition between carriers and the rendition by them of effi-
cient and adequate service to the public."197 
The decisions discussed above reflect the Commission's con-
cern about the anti-competitive consequences of horizontal unifica-
tions. Indeed, it would seem that such concern is stronger than 
with respect to end-to-end mergers. The potentiality of danger 
to existing carriers rendering efficient service in the same terri-
tory as the proposed horizontal combination may be greater than 
the peril of monopoly inherent in end-to-end mergers. On the 
other hand, the smaller number of horizontal applications 
may suggest that such transactions are less attractive to the in-
dustry. End-to-end and horizontal mergers may, of course, be 
combined in one transaction, as in the McLean Trucking Co. 
case, but this does not seem to be typical. 
Campbell, 40 M.C.C. 333 (1945) (vendor would cancel operating rights between points 
served by vendee). See also Baggett-Control-Walker Hauling Co., 65 M.C.C. 522 (1955); 
Atlantic Freight Lines-Purchase-Shipley, 40 M.C.C. 183 (1945), and Lincoln Transport 
Systems, Inc.-Control-Boss-Linco Lines, Inc. and Faxlines, 70 M.C.C. 205 (1956), for 
unconditional approvals. 
196 39 M.C.C. 373 (1943). 
197 Id. at 377. Cited and followed in Dobbs-Control-Van Hooser, 39 M.C.C. 647 at 
654 (1944), modified 40 M.C.C. 804, and Peerless, Inc.-Control-Karst Freight Lines, 39 
M.C.C. 683 at 696 (1944). See also Columbia Terminals Co.-Issuance of Notes, 40 M.C.C. 
288 at 294 (1945) [§10 of Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. (1952) §20) applicable to issuance of 
notes by corporation controlling three contract carriers and several lessors of equipment; 
issuance authorized only after competitive bidding]. 
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CONCLUSION 
The soundness of the considerations on which Federal Motor 
Carrier Regulation rests has frequently been questioned. There 
is much support for the proposition that motor carriers, unlike 
railroads, are not natural monopolies because minimum and fixed 
investments are relatively small and, therefore, economic regula-
tion of an essentially competitive industry is unwarranted.198 To 
the adherents of this view "regulated competition is a mis-
nomer"199 because "competition without freedom of entry is com-
petition in an incubator."200 
This controversy is outside the scope of the present discus-
sion. Rather, the survey in the preceding pages attempted to 
analyze and interpret the decisions on the basis of existing law 
which reflects the assumption that a public utility-type regulation 
is needed in order to prevent excessive competition. Charges 
against the Commission of discrimination against small carriers201 
and fostering a "dramatic increase" in trucking concentration202 
overlook the fact that the Commission has no explicit or unquali-
10s Testimony of Paul Stevens, Small Business Hearings, note 67 supra, pp. 213-218, 
and James C. Nelson, id. at 235, 236: "The so-called public utility industries generally 
require a large minimum investment and much fixed investment, with the additional 
result that economies of utilization •.. can be obtained by allowing additional business 
to go to existing firms up to the point where least-cost utilization of a given plant is 
achieved .••. Fixed investments and thus fixed costs are small because the truckers do 
not have to provide their own rights-of-ways •... Moreover, their terminal investments 
do not impose high fixed costs ... investment in equipment .•• is in relatively short-lived 
and small-scale units ..• trucking, by its inherent nature is well organized as a highly 
competitive rather than a monopolistic industry." See also Pegrum, "The Economic 
Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport," 28 LAND ECONOMICS 244 at 252-258 (1952). 
S. Hearings Before Small Business Committee (Trucking Mergers and Concentration), 
85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 54, 91, 125, 221 (1957). 
199 Pegrum, "The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport," 28 LAND 
ECONOMICS 244 at 258 (1952). 
200 Id. at 254. 
201 See Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 276-303, 333-350 (discussing condonation 
of unlawful unified operations without prior Commission approval, acquisition of dormant 
rights and mergers of carriers of household goods). Cf. North American Van Lines-Pur-
chase (Portion)-Creston Transfer Co., 13 CCH Fed. Car. Cas.1f34,255 (1958) (right to trans. 
port pianos, organs and organ benches excluded from approval of acquisition of authority 
by North-American in order to protect small carrier of these goods operating seven 
vehicles). Unifications involving an aggregate number of 20 or less vehicles are not subject 
to section 5 [49 U.S.C. (1952) §5(10)), but to the Commission's rules on Transfer of Operat-
ing Rights, Title 49, Part 179, C.F.R. (1949, 1958 Supp.), issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
(1952) §312(b); authority sustained in United States v. Resler, 313 U.S. 57 (1941). In 1956 
there were 994 such applications, of which 157 were denied for lack of fitness. All others 
were granted. S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. 112. 
202 S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. Ill: The Adams Report, note 58 supra, shows 
that, in 1954, 4.7% of the carriers had 63% of the revenue. Chairman Clarke replied 
that this was "infinitesimal,'' since the largest carrier had less than 2% of the business. 
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fied mandate to prevent concentration. The real quarrel of the 
critics, as Professor Jaffe suggested, 203 is, therefore, with Congress 
for failing to provide for such specific mandate, or with the Su-
preme Court for failing to resolve the conflict between section 7 of 
the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act 
along the lines suggested by the dissent in the McLean Trucking 
Co. case. As noted in Part II above, the majority opinion in that 
case directed the Commission merely to consider competition as an 
important factor in each case, but to subordinate it to concentra-
tion if it finds the latter more conducive to insure efficient trans-
portation. This makes the Commission's job much more difficult 
than that of the antitrust enforcement agencies. The latter, in 
the free segment of the economy, owe undivided allegiance to 
only one sovereign: section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
Our discussion of the cases demonstrates, I submit, that the 
Commission has considered competition in each case.204 On the 
whole, its performance of this task has been more convincing in 
the trucking field than with regard to intercity buses. The Grey-
hound mergers examined in Part III show contradictions in treat-
ment which, in some instances, emphasizes the perils of monopoly, 
while praising the unmatched power of the system in others. In 
the latter group of cases, "consideration" of competition sometimes 
may have given way to disregard for competition. The trucking 
cases, on the other hand, show a more consistent pattern. In the 
first place, there is no single integrated and predominant giant 
comparable to Greyhound; the structure of the trucking industry 
with its many large carriers is thus much sounder. Secondly, we 
observed that the majority of substantial unifications were of the 
end-to-end or vertical type. They offer such obvious advantages 
as substitution of through service for the hazards of interlining 
that a prima facie case in their favor205 often appears plausible. At 
203 Jaffe, "The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat," 65 YALE L. J. 1068 at 1072 
(1956). 
204 Statement of Commissioner Mitchell, S. Hearings, note 198 supra, p. 115. The 
Senate Select Committee on Small Business admonished the Commission to do so, to keep 
records of §5 cases, and to evaluate generally the level of concentration in the industry. 
S. Rep. 1441, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1958). 
205 The Adams Report, note 58 supra, pp. 309-315, 378-384, challenges the Com-
mission's assumptions that increased size means greater efficiency. This criticism may 
have general validity and deeper analysis of the problem by the Commission would, 
certainly, be desirable. Yet Dr. Adams observes "-that high .tonmile costs seem related 
to short hauls." Id. at 314. Is this not an implied admission of the case for end-to-end 
mergers? 
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least, those advantages appeared in many cases substantial enough 
to warrant approval pursuant to the McLean Trucking Co. formu-
la. No comparable case can be made for horizontal mergers, and 
the Commission's attitude toward such transactions206 is helpful for 
the preservation of competition. 
Consideration of com petition in trucking merger cases has 
proceeded on the theory that unifications should be prevented 
only when they would impair the ability of competitors to con-
tinue as common carriers. This is consistent with the idea of "reg-
ulated" or "controlled" competition. It is assumed that competi-
tion is a desirable stimulant, but only up to a peril point beyond 
which it begins to destroy itself. That approach may, after all, 
not differ very radically from the notion that some mergers would 
lessen or destroy competition while others would not. Hence, the 
concept of "regulated" competition may, at least with respect to 
mergers, be less outlandish than its opponents believe. In any 
event, the Commission's theory demonstrates its concern for 
competition. 
Obviously, theories must stand the test of practical application. 
As pointed out in Part IV above, the Commission has been criti-
cized for its failure to spell out general standards or criteria for 
determination of the crucial question whether ability of com-
petitors to continue as common carriers will be impaired or 
whether they could stand adjustments to stiffer competition.207 
This criticism seems justified: insufficient elaboration of the basis 
for the conclusions reached and vacillation shown by reversals of 
prior opinions indicate that in a not insignificant number of 
reports the point may have been decided merely by intuitive ad 
hoc judgment. Surely, the Commission could do better than that. 
Apparently, the Commission is not unaware of this deficiency. 
Indeed, in Pacific lntermountain Express-Control and Merger-
Union Transfer Co., decided on February 26, 1958,208 Division 4 
reopened proceedings on a merger application on the ground 
that applicants had "offered no evidence showing the possible 
effect which ... [the merger] will have on the present traffic pat- · 
tern of ... [competing] carriers." Particularly, P.I.E. had not dis-
206 Although -McLean Trucking involved both vertical and horizontal mergers, it 
is doubtful whether approval would have been granted without the vertical nature of 
the transaction. The Supreme Court emphasized the end-to-end feature. 
207 See note 162 supra, and text thereto. 
208 12 CCH Fed. Car. Cas. 1J34,243 (1958). 
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closed what volume, if any, it had interlined with carriers other 
than vendor moving to and from points served by vendor. The vol-
ume interlined between the applicants had been insignificant. Re-
ferring to section 7 of the Clayton Act and quoting that part of the 
McLean Trucking Co. opinion which admonished the Commission 
"to consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the 
general competitive situation," the division said: 
"The serious responsibility which the Congress has imposed 
upon us in these proceedings cannot be properly discharged 
upon records such as this .... Nor are we relieved of this re-
sponsibility by the fact that many of the competing carriers 
refrained from intervening and introducing evidence. If 
that were true, monopolies could develop merely from in-
action by competing carriers, and applications would be 
granted by default. The burden is upon applicants to submit 
the necessary evidence, ... particularly in respect of the pos-
sible effect upon competing carriers. For example, the record 
is devoid of evidence showing the extent to which the ad-
ditional long-haul through service from Chicago, Minneapolis 
and St. Paul to the West Coast by Pacific Intermountain 
might reduce the opportunities for balance between short-
haul and long-haul traffic of the numerous carriers serving 
the same territory, thereby substantially lessening their op-
portunity to maintain presently satisfactory service to the 
public. 
"The time has come when the carriers and the public 
should be put on notice that this Commission expects appli-
cants in Section 5 proceedings to support their proposals in 
keeping with the legislative standards as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court .... " 
The effect of this opinion on the future cannot be predicted. 
Yet, its holding that the absence of protest by competitors will 
henceforth not be considered as favorable to proposed acquisitions 
by large carriers like P .I.E. is novel, and the general tone of the 
report may herald a change of climate adverse to mergers. The 
pending "unusually large" unification applications of Consolidated 
Freightways and others209 afford ample opportunity to the Com-
mission to reveal its thinking. It is to be hoped that this will lead 
to the much needed careful analysis as to where and how the elusive 
line is to be drawn between "constructive" and "destructive" 
competition. 
209 I.C.C. 71ST ANN. REP. 55 (1957). 
